政府会计监督与银行信贷行为研究——基于财政部会计信息质量随机检查的证据  被引量:27

Government Accounting Oversight and Bank Lending Behavior: Evidence from the Random Inspection of Accounting Information Quality by the Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China

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作  者:祝继高[1] 朱佳信 李天时 宫迪 Zhu Jigao;Zhu Jiaxin;Li Tianshi;Gong Di(Business School,University of International Business and Economics;School of Accounting,Capital University of Economics Business;School of Banking and Finance,University of International Business and Economics)

机构地区:[1]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院 [2]首都经济贸易大学会计学院 [3]对外经济贸易大学金融学院

出  处:《管理世界》2023年第1期157-176,189,共21页Journal of Management World

基  金:国家社会科学基金重大项目“‘一带一路’投资安全保障体系研究”(基金号:19ZDA101)的资助。

摘  要:新时代赋予财会监督新的定位,对会计监督维护市场秩序、防范金融风险提出更高的要求。本文利用财政部会计信息质量随机检查的准自然实验,以2004~2020年中国138家商业银行为研究对象,检验了政府会计监督的效果。研究发现:(1)银行接受财政部会计信息质量随机检查后,银行的贷款集中度和房地产行业贷款比例显著降低,不良贷款率显著下降,财务业绩显著提升;(2)会计信息质量随机检查通过识别银行信贷管理和信贷核算问题,对银行信贷行为发挥监督效应;(3)在会计信息质量随机检查行政执法力度较强、延伸检查至银行聘请的会计师事务所以及媒体关注较强时,政府会计监督效应更强,并且可以对同地区未接受检查的银行起到警示效果;(4)对处于市场化水平较低地区、未实现跨省经营、非上市和独立董事比例较低的银行,会计信息质量随机检查发挥的监督效应更强。本文的研究结论对完善财会监督体系、防范化解重大金融风险具有积极的启示作用。Accounting oversight has been reposited with higher requirements to maintain market order and prevent financial risks in the new era.Based on 138 commercial banks’ data in China from 2004 to 2020,this paper examines the effects of government accounting oversight on banks,using a quasi-natural experiment of the Ministry of Finance’s Accounting Information Quality Random Inspection.The empirical results show that:(1) After being subject to the Accounting Information Quality Random Inspection,the banks’ loan concentration and the proportion of loans in the real estate sector significantly decrease;the banks’ asset quality and performance significantly improve;(2) Accounting Information Quality Random Inspection exerts oversight effect on bank lending by identifying bank loan loss provisions,loan recognition,loan flows and loan management problems;(3) Accounting Information Quality Random Inspection has stronger impacts when the inspection’s administration enforcement is stronger,when the inspection is extended to accounting firms hired by banks,and when media attention is stronger.Moreover,Accounting Information Quality Random Inspection has a warning effect on banks in the same region that have not been inspected;(4) For banks located in a place with lower marketization,banks that do not operate across provinces,non-listed banks and banks with a low proportion of independent directors,the oversight effect of Accounting Information Quality Random Inspection is stronger.Our study provides positive implications for improving accounting oversight system and preventing and dissolving major financial risks.

关 键 词:政府会计监督 银行信贷行为 会计信息质量随机检查 财会监督 

分 类 号:F810.6[经济管理—财政学] F832.4

 

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