城市轨道交通枢纽智慧安检联防信号博弈模型  

Signal game model of intelligent joint defense security inspection in urban rail transit hubs

作　　者：李德龙 刘德海 LI Delong;LIU Dehai(School of Business Administration,Inner Mongolia University of Finance and Economics,Hohhot 010070,China;School of Public Administration,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,China)

机构地区：[1]内蒙古财经大学工商管理学院,呼和浩特010070 [2]东北财经大学公共管理学院,大连116025

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2022年第12期3363-3380,共18页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71874024,71971045);内蒙古自治区自然科学基金(2022QN07003);祖国北疆资源利用与环境保护协调发展院士专家工作站开放课题(2021NCDYSZJGZZ-001);内蒙古自治区高等学校创新团队发展计划(NMGIRT 2202)。

摘　　要：在融合人脸识别技术和白名单安检制度的新型城市轨道交通智慧安检模式构建过程中,仍面临着基于联防机制的安检网络设计、安检网络安全性评价机制设计以及考虑袭击者情绪的安检信号策略设计等难点.本文首先提出并构建了基于人脸识别和白名单制度的城市轨道交通智慧安检二级联防模型,然后构建考虑袭击者情绪的涉恐防暴安检信号博弈模型,并得到了兼顾效率与安全的三条精炼贝叶斯均衡路径和安检部门的最优信号发布策略.研究发现,袭击者通过伪装来躲避人脸识别的成功率越大,安检部门越应强化针对违禁品的检测能力,而非持续提升针对乘客身份属性的联防能力.袭击者的渗透策略将直接影响安检部门联防策略,当选择渗透白名单通道时,接警反应时间有效率与信息同步水平互补;反之,接警反应时间有效率与普通通道安全性互补.与此同时,信号策略的制定应充分考虑袭击者情绪、低能力安检部门占比、袭击者对低能力安检部门占比的信念等,如只有当低能力安检部门占比较低时,分离信号策略才可能占优,否则安检部门应选择高能力混同信号.In the construction process of the new urban rail transit intelligent security inspection mode integrating face recognition technology and white list security inspection system,there still exist some scientific difficulties such as designing security inspection network based on joint defense mechanism,designing security inspection network security evaluation mechanism and designing security inspection signal strategy considering the attackers’emotion.Firstly,this paper proposes a two-level joint defense model of urban rail transit hubs,which takes the face recognition system as the first level and the white list channel as the second level.Then,a signaling game model of terrorist and riot related security inspection considering the attacker’s emotion is constructed,and three refined Bayesian equilibrium paths considering efficiency and safety and the optimal signal release strategy of the security inspection departments are obtained.The study finds that the greater the success rate of attackers avoiding face recognition through camouflage strategy,the more the security inspection departments should strengthen the detection ability for contraband,rather than continuously improve the joint defense ability for passenger identity attributes.The penetration strategy of attackers into the white list channel or ordinary channel directly affects the joint defense strategy of the security inspection departments.When the white list channel is selected,the efficiency of alarm response time and the level of information synchronization complement each other;On the contrary,the efficiency of alarm response time is complementary to the safety of ordinary channels.The formulation of security inspection signal strategy should fully consider the attackers’emotion,the proportion of low-capacity security inspection departments,the attackers’belief in the proportion of lowcapacity security inspection departments,etc.for example,when the proportion of low-capacity security inspection departments is relatively low,the security

关 键 词：安检 信号博弈 反恐 人脸识别 白名单制度 

分 类 号：C930[经济管理—管理学]