基于奖惩机制的网络货运平台监管策略演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Regulating Strategy Based on Reward and Punishment Mechanisms

作　　者：甘卫华[1] 刘郑 刘亚楠 李春芝[1] Gan Weihua;Liu Zheng;Liu Yanan;Li Chunzhi(School of Transportation Engineering,East China Jiaotong University,Nanchang 330013,China)

机构地区：[1]华东交通大学交通运输工程学院,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《华东交通大学学报》2023年第1期34-43,共10页Journal of East China Jiaotong University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72061013)。

摘　　要：基于演化博弈理论,引入奖励和惩罚机制,构建网络货运平台与政府监管部门间的演化博弈模型,并对其均衡点的稳定性进行分析。理论研究与仿真结果表明:在静态惩罚下,无论是静态还是动态的奖励机制,系统均不存在均衡稳定点;在静态奖励动态惩罚和动态奖惩机制下,两者均趋于一个稳定的均衡点,且在动态奖惩机制下效果更好;网络货运平台的运营行为受到政府奖惩政策的影响,且惩罚机制的约束性作用更为显著。Based on evolutionary game theory,with the introduction of reward and punishment mechanisms,an evolutionary game model between online freight platforms and government regulators is constructed,and the stability of their equilibrium points is analyzed.The results show that under static punishment,there is no equilibrium stability point in the system,no matter whether the reward mechanism is static or dynamic;under the static reward dynamic punishment and dynamic reward and punishment mechanism,both sides tend to reach a stable equilibrium point,and the effect is better under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism;the online freight platforms'behavior is affected by the government′s reward and punishment mechanism,and the binding effect of the punishment mechanism is more significant.

关 键 词：网络货运平台 动态奖惩机制 演化博弈 政府监管 

分 类 号：U492[交通运输工程—交通运输规划与管理] F542[交通运输工程—道路与铁道工程]