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作 者:郑梦婷 高晓宁 Zheng Mengting;Gao Xiaoning(School of Management,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou Henan 450001;Research Center of Data Science,Zhengzhou Henan 450001)
机构地区:[1]郑州大学信息管理学院,河南郑州450001 [2]郑州市数据科学研究中心,河南郑州450001
出 处:《情报探索》2023年第2期107-114,共8页Information Research
基 金:国家社会科学基金重大项目“政府数据的隐私风险计量与保护机制创新研究”(项目编号:21&ZD338)成果之一。
摘 要:[目的/意义]厘清成员馆与中心馆的利益博弈关系,构建成员馆风险防范机制对提升数字资源共享效果具有重要意义。[方法/过程]探究信息不对称条件下中心馆与成员馆的利益博弈关系,引入激励因子设计奖惩函数,建立中心馆委托下的成员馆风险防范模型。[结果/结论]结合模型分析结论,利用MATLAB实验平台进行仿真分析,模拟激励因子、预期收益目标、随机因子等因素变量对成员馆努力行为和各主体收益的交互影响,从中求解出最优激励因子。成员馆风险防范机制可有效协调中心馆与成员馆的利益博弈关系,最大化高校图书馆数字资源共享收益。[Purpose/significance] It is important to clarify the interest game relationship between member libraries and central libraries and construct the risk prevention mechanism of member libraries to improve the effect of digital resource sharing. [Method/process] This paper explores the interest game relationship between the central library and member libraries under the condition of asymmetric information,introduces incentive factors to design reward and punishment functions,and establishes the risk prevention model of member libraries entrusted by the central library.[Results/conclusion] Combined with the conclusion of the model analysis,the MATLAB experimental platform was used to simulate the interaction of different incentive factors,expected income target,random factors and other factors on the member library’s effort behaviors and the income of each subject,and the optimal incentive factors were solved.The risk prevention mechanism of member libraries can effectively coordinate the interest game relationship between central libraries and member libraries and maximize the benefits of digital resource sharing in university libraries.
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