我国反垄断法纵向垄断协议安全港制度的完善  

Perfection of the Safe Harbor System of the Vertical Monopoly Agreement in China’s Anti-monopoly Law

作　　者：刘继峰[1] Liu Jifeng

机构地区：[1]中国政法大学民商经济法学院,北京100088

出　　处：《中州学刊》2023年第2期64-72,共9页Academic Journal of Zhongzhou

摘　　要：在反垄断法中,纵向垄断协议行为具有鲜明的特性,其调整方法具有很强的特殊性,安全港制度便是一种特殊的调整方法。我国修正后的反垄断法增加了安全港制度,但留下了一些空白。正在建构的安全港制度混淆了其与一般豁免制度之间的关系,偏离了安全港制度的目标和效率。在我国,构建独立的安全港制度这个任务能否完成主要依赖“国务院反垄断执法机构规定的其他条件”如何建构。建构内容只能以简化程序、证实行为“不会产生显著不利影响”为中心展开。基于此,在内容上,“其他条件”既需要完善实体性条件,也需要细化程序条件。In the anti-monopoly law, the behavior of vertical monopoly agreement has distinct characteristics, and its adjustment method has strong particularity. The safe harbor system is a special adjustment method. China’s amended anti-monopoly law has added the safe harbor system, but left some gaps. The safe harbor system under construction confuses its own relationship with the general exemption system, and deviates from the goal and efficiency of the safe harbor system. In China, whether the task of building an independent safe harbor system can be completed depends mainly on how to build “other conditions stipulated by the anti-monopoly law enforcement agency of the State Council”. The construction content can only be carried out with the focus of simplifying the procedure and confirming that the behavior “will not have significant adverse effects”. Based on this, in terms of content, “other conditions” not only need to improve entity conditions, but also need to refine procedural conditions.

关 键 词：反垄断法 安全港制度 适用范围 程序条件 实体条件 

分 类 号：D922.29[政治法律—经济法学]