官员任期、政策偏好与城市创新  

Officials′ tenure, policy preferences and urban innovation

作　　者：邓洁 潘爽 叶德珠[3,4] Deng Jie;Pan Shuang;Ye Dezhu(College of Finance,Guangdong University of Foreign Studies,Guangzhou 510006,Guangdong,China;School of Accounting Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang 330013,Jiangxi,China;College of Economics,Jinan University,Guangzhou 510632,Guangdong,China;Financial Research Institute,Jinan University,Guangzhou 510632,Guangdong,China)

机构地区：[1]广东外语外贸大学金融学院,广东广州510006 [2]江西财经大学会计学院,江西南昌330013 [3]暨南大学经济学院,广东广州510632 [4]暨南大学金融研究所,广东广州510632

出　　处：《科研管理》2023年第1期114-124,共11页Science Research Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目:“金融与实体经济的结构匹配及其经济增长效应研究”(19AJY026,2019.06—2022.06)。

摘　　要：晋升锦标赛下,官员在有限任期内存在晋升预期差异,由此导致的短视行为的变化可能对创新产出造成影响。然而现有文献并未从官员晋升动机视角深入研究城市创新的制度动因,也未曾厘清官员任期等政治体制对创新活动的具体影响机制。本文利用2004—2016年285个城市的面板数据,通过多元统计回归分析,实证检验了官员任期如何通过经济增长目标影响城市创新的机制路径,并从土地财政、环境治理视角提出了新机制路径。研究发现:(1)相对于市长,市委书记任期对城市创新的影响更大,且呈现出显著的倒U型关系;(2)市委书记的更替显著抑制了城市创新水平的提升;(3)机制分析发现,市委书记的任期通过动态影响经济增长目标制定,土地财政依赖以及环境治理水平进而对城市创新产生影响。譬如当经济增长目标越高,官员越倾向于采用短视的扩张策略刺激经济,进而减少对创新活动的投入;(4)异质性分析发现在市场化条件较好,东部以及城市规模较大的地区,市委书记任期对创新的U型特征仍然显著。本文建议政府在推进财政分权体制改革时,应采用因地制宜的推进方式,将“有效市场”与“有为政府”更好地结合起来。本文研究结论丰富了晋升锦标赛理论的经验证据,有助于理解行政体制对高质量转型发展的影响。Based on the background of the promotion tournament, there exist the differences between officials′ promotion expectations during their limited tenure. Those differences may cause the officials′ myopic behavior and thereby affect innovation outputs. However, limited existing literatures have studied institutional motivation of urban innovation from an officials′ promotion perspective. Also, they have not clarified clearly the specific influence mechanism of political institutions, including officials′ tenure on urban innovation. Therefore, according to existing studies, for the sample period of 2004-2016, we utilize the panel data of 285 cities to examine how officials′ tenure affects urban innovation through economic growth targets, and further propose two new mechanism paths from the perspectives of land finance and environmental governance. The conclusions drawn by using the method of multivariate statistical regression analysis show that:(1) The municipal party secretaries′ tenures have a greater impact on urban innovation, relative to that of mayors, showing a significant inverted U-shaped relationship;(2) The municipal party secretaries′ turnovers significantly inhibit urban innovation;(3) The mechanism analysis indicates that the municipal party secretaries′ tenures affect urban innovation through three channels, including setting economic growth target, land finance and environmental governance. For example, with a higher economic growth target, the officials are more likely to adopt short-sighted expansion strategy to stimulate the economy, and then restrain urban innovation;(4) Heterogeneity test results show that the U-shaped characteristics of the municipal party secretaries′ tenures on urban innovation are still significant in regions with higher marketisation, in the eastern China or in the larger cities. This study contributes to several strands as follows:(1) Our conclusions can enrich the empirical evidence for the theory of promotion incentives. The majority of existing literat

关 键 词：官员任期 城市创新 晋升锦标赛 高质量发展 

分 类 号：F061.5[经济管理—政治经济学]