高管风险承担激励与企业债务契约  

Executive Risk-taking Incentives and Corporate Debt Contracts

作　　者：陈鹏程 侯淑贤 王开阳 Chen Pengcheng;Hou Shuxian;Wang Kaiyang

机构地区：[1]郑州大学商学院

出　　处：《投资研究》2022年第11期44-64,共21页Review of Investment Studies

基　　金：河南省哲学社会科学规划项目:股权激励业绩考核“精准达标”现象研究(2022BJJ097);河南省软科学项目:国有控股上市公司股权激励的风险承担效应研究(222400410585);河南省教育厅人文社科项目:股权激励下的国有企业风险承担效应及提升策略研究(2022-ZZJH-268);郑州大学青年人才创新团队支持计划:数字普惠金融供应链的分工协同机理、风险及治理优化研究(32320293)。

摘　　要：以中国A股市场授予高管股票期权的上市公司为研究对象,考察高管风险承担激励对企业债务契约的影响。结果表明,高管风险承担激励传递了积极信号,增加了企业银行信贷和债券融资规模,延长了企业银行信贷和债券融资的期限并降低了银行信贷成本,同时由于替代效应的存在减少了企业对商业信用的占用。进一步研究发现,高管风险承担激励与企业债务契约的上述关系在高增长机会和信用状况良好的企业中更为显著。This paper takes the companies listed on China’s A-share market which have granted executive stock options as the research object,investigate the effect of executive risk incentive on corporate debt contracts.This study found that executive risktaking incentives send positive signals and mitigate information asymmetries between companies and creditors,increasing the size of corporate bank credit and bond financing,extending the maturity of bank credit and bond financing and reducing the cost of bank credit,while reducing corporate exposure to commercial credit due to the substitution effect.Further heterogeneity analysis shows that the above relationship between executive risk-taking incentives and corporate debt contract is more pronounced among firms with high growth opportunities and good credit standing.

关 键 词：高管股票期权 风险承担激励 企业债务契约 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F272.91F275