基于绿色技术创新和制造商竞争的绿色供应链微分博弈研究  

Differential Game Study of Green Supply Chain Based on Green Technology Innovation and Manufacturer Competition

作　　者：刘丽 韩同银[1] 金浩[1] LIU Li;HAN Tongyin;JIN Hao(Hebei University of Technology,Tianjin,China)

机构地区：[1]河北工业大学经济管理学院,天津市300401

出　　处：《管理学报》2023年第1期116-126,共11页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(19BGL054);国家社会科学基金资助青年项目(20CRK010)。

摘　　要：引入绿色技术创新过程,构建由单个共享供应商和两个制造商组成的绿色供应链,利用随机停止模型刻画绿色技术创新对绿色研发投入决策的影响,基于微分博弈研究供应链的绿色研发投入决策与协调。研究发现:较高的技术创新成功概率和绿色度提升率能够激励企业增加技术创新成功前的绿色研发投入,提高产品绿色度;绿色技术创新对制造商绿色研发投入的影响程度与绿色竞争强度有关;双向成本分担契约可以协调供应链,其中共享供应商对制造商绿色研发投入成本的分担比例与绿色竞争强度负相关,而两个制造商对共享供应商绿色研发投入成本的分担比例之和是确定的。By introducing the innovation process of green technology,this study constructs a green supply chain composed of a single shared supplier and two manufacturers,and uses a stochastic stopping model to describe the impact of green technology innovation on green R&D investment decisions.Based on the differential game,the green R&D investment decisions and coordination of supply chain are researched.The results show that:a higher probability of success of technological innovation and a higher rate of greenness improvement can motivate enterprises to increase green R&D investment before successful technological innovation,and then improve product greenness.The impact of green technology innovation on manufacturers’green R&D investment is related to the intensity of green competition.The bidirectional cost-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain,in which the share ratio of the shared supplier to the manufacturers’green R&D input cost is negatively correlated with the intensity of green competition,and the sum of the share ratio of the two manufacturers to the shared supplier’s green R&D input cost is determined.

关 键 词：绿色技术创新 制造商竞争 绿色供应链 微分博弈 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]