考虑主播带货努力与影响力的直播电商供应链激励契约研究  

Contract Design of Live Streaming Commerce Supply Chain Considering the Effort and Influence of the Streamer

作　　者：张艳芬 徐琪[1] 孙中苗 ZHANG Yanfen;XU Qi;SUN Zhongmiao(Donghua University,Shanghai,China)

机构地区：[1]东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海市200051

出　　处：《管理学报》2023年第2期278-286,共9页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(21BGL014)。

摘　　要：直播电商供应链中,针对主播带货努力和影响力双重信息不对称所带来的道德风险与逆向选择问题,考虑主播议价能力,基于委托代理理论构建信息不对称下的激励契约模型,提出甄别主播真实影响力以及激励主播提高带货努力的契约条件。研究表明:①品牌供应商不得不额外支付高影响力主播一定的信息租金;②高影响力主播的坑位费增加但佣金率不变,低影响力主播的佣金率降低但坑位费视情况而定,当低影响力主播的影响力值大于一定阈值时,坑位费适当提高,反之则坑位费降低或采用纯佣金模式;③品牌供应商对主播影响力的不同事前信念将导致最优契约的不同配置。To address the moral hazard and adverse selection problems caused by the double information asymmetry of streamers’sale efforts and influence in the live streaming commerce supply chain,this studyconstructs an incentive contract model under information asymmetry based on principal-agent theory by considering the bargaining power of streamers,and proposes contract conditions to discriminate the actual type of information and induce the streamer to improve sales efforts.It is shown that the brand supplier has to pay a certainamount of extra information rent for the high-influence streamer under the asymmetry of type information.At this time,the brand supplier should increase the slotting fee of the high-influence streamer and keep the commission rate unchanged,while the commission rate of the low-influence streamer is appropriately reduced and the slotting fee of the low-influence streamer depends on the situation.When the influence of the low-influence streamer is greater than a certain threshold,it should increase the slotting fee appropriately,otherwise reduce the slotting fee or adopt a pure commission model.Further,different prior beliefs about the influence of the streamer will directly lead to different configurations of optimal contracts.

关 键 词：直播电商供应链 主播影响力 主播带货努力 道德风险 信息甄别 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]