财政分权、比较优势与绿色经济发展——基于新结构经济学视角  被引量:2

Fiscal Decentralization,Comparative Advantage and Development of Green Economy:From the Perspective of New Structural Economics

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作  者:王文豪[1] 赵国春[1] 张斌[1] WANG Wen-hao;ZHAO Guo-chun;ZHANG Bin(College of Finance and Taxation,Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics,Urumqi Xinjiang 830012,China)

机构地区:[1]新疆财经大学财政税务学院,新疆乌鲁木齐830012

出  处:《技术经济与管理研究》2023年第2期86-91,共6页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

基  金:新疆维吾尔自治区社会科学基金项目(18BJY031);新疆维吾尔自治区高校科研计划青年项目(XJEDU2020SY020)。

摘  要:文章理论阐述了财政分权、比较优势对绿色经济发展影响的传导机制,并选取2007—2020年省级面板数据实证检验其传导机制。实证结果表明:财政分权对绿色经济发展虽然存在抑制作用,但提高财政分权程度能够激励地方政府通过制定符合地方比较优势的发展战略来有效促进绿色经济发展,比较优势在其中产生了正向中介和调节作用。而后通过门槛效应拓展分析发现,财政分权对绿色经济发展的抑制作用存在边际递减,而其对比较优势的正向效应在增强,比较优势在财政分权与绿色经济发展中的正向中介作用在边际增强。This paper theoretically expounds the transmission mechanism of the impact of fiscal decentralization and comparative advantage on the development of green economy, and empirically tests its transmission mechanism by using provincial panel data from2007 to 2020. The empirical results show that although fiscal decentralization has a restraining effect on the development of green economy, improving the degree of fiscal decentralization can encourage local governments to effectively promote the development of green economy by formulating development strategies that conform to local comparative advantages, in which comparative advantages play a positive intermediary and regulatory role. The analysis of threshold effect expansion shows that the inhibitory effect of fiscal decentralization on green economic development is decreasing at the margin, while its positive effect on comparative advantage is increasing. The positive intermediary effect of comparative advantage in fiscal decentralization and green economic development is increasing at the margin.

关 键 词:财政分权 绿色经济发展 比较优势 

分 类 号:F014.1[经济管理—政治经济学]

 

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