用户不完全信息下物流平台增值服务投资决策  

Investment Decision of Value-Added Services of Logistics Platform Under Incomplete User Information

作　　者：桂云苗[1] 翟慧慧 龚本刚[1] GUI Yunmiao;ZHAI Huihui;GONG Bengang(School of Economics and Management,Anhui Polytechnic University,WWuhu 241000)

机构地区：[1]安徽工程大学经济与管理学院,芜湖241000

出　　处：《系统科学与数学》2022年第12期3273-3287,共15页Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(72071002);安徽省自然科学基金(2008085MG229);安徽高校研究生科学研究项目(YJS20210455)资助课题。

摘　　要：为了提高物流平台的竞争绩效,在考虑用户不完全信息状态下消极性预期对用户效用与平台利润的影响基础上,建立基于Hotelling的物流平台增值服务投资决策模型,分析了主从博弈时序和用户不同归属结构下平台增值服务投资决策的均衡解.通过研究发现,当增值服务的投资成本大于一定阈值且用户不完全信息时,跟随型物流平台的增值服务最优投资量高于领导型物流平台的最优投资量;当车主入驻多平台时,领导型物流平台的最优投资量随着用户的网络外部性强度增大而减少,而跟随型物流平台的最优投资量随着用户的网络外部性强度增大而增大;当货主入驻多平台且两边用户不完全信息时,领导型平台和跟随型物流平台应减少投资量;当车主和货主都入驻多平台且货主不完全信息时,领导型物流平台与跟随型物流平台应提高投资量.In order to improve the competitive performance of the logistics platform,considering the impact of negative expectations on users’ utility and platform profits in the state of incomplete information of users,a value-added service investment decision model of the logistics platform based on Hotelling is established,and the equilibrium solution of the platform value-added service investment decision under the master-slave game sequence and different user attribution structures is analyzed.The research shows that when the investment cost of value-added services is greater than a certain threshold and users have incomplete information,the investment volume of the follower platform in the market should be higher than that of the leader platform.When car owners settle on multiple platforms,the optimal investment of the leading logistics platform decreases with the increase of the user’s network externality strength.However,the optimal investment amount of the follow-up logistics platform increases with the increase of the user’s network externality strength.When the cargo owner settles on multiple platforms and the users on both sides have incomplete information,the leading platform and the follower logistics platform should reduce the amount of investment.When both the vehicle owner and the cargo owner are on multiple platforms and the cargo owner has incomplete information,the leading logistics platform and the follower logistics platform should increase the investment.

关 键 词：物流平台 增值服务投资 Hotelling博弈 用户不完全信息 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]