计及配额考核约束的发电商与大用户直购电博弈优化模型  

Game Optimization Model of Direct Power Purchase Between Power Suppliers and Large Consumers with RPS Assessment Constrains

作　　者：李飞[1,2] 李咸善[1,2] 鲁明芳[1,2] 张磊[2] LI Fei;LI Xianshan;LU Mingfang;ZHANG Lei(Hubei Provincial Key Laboratory for Operation and Control of Cascaded Hydropower Station,China Three Gorges University,Yichang 443002,China;College of Electrical Engineering&New Energy,China Three Gorges University,Yichang 443002,China)

机构地区：[1]三峡大学梯级水电站运行与控制湖北省重点实验室,宜昌443002 [2]三峡大学电气与新能源学院,宜昌443002

出　　处：《高电压技术》2023年第1期128-137,共10页High Voltage Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(52007103)。

摘　　要：在大用户直购电交易中,实施可再生能源配额制(renewable portfolio standard,RPS)会引发绿、火电商之间市场力不均等的竞争性售电,大用户也需应对负荷平衡与RPS考核的双重压力。为解决多发电商竞价与多大用户直购电交易的耦合优化决策问题和实现多主体共赢,建立了RPS驱动下绿、火电商竞价和大用户直购电的双层博弈优化模型。外层多发电商构成非合作博弈,各发电商通过博弈竞价以获得大用户更多的购电;内层多发电商和多大用户构成主从博弈,各发电商优化报价以满足售电利润最大,各大用户优化购电方案满足RPS考核并降低交易成本,实现供需双方共赢。采用KKT条件和不动点型迭代算法求解优化模型,仿真结果表明,RPS驱动和博弈竞价机制可提升绿电商竞争力,并降低了用户交易成本;但当RPS配比上升到一定程度时,大用户博弈能力削弱,交易成本反弹。该方法可为RPS下大用户直购电策略优化提供决策参考。In direct power purchase of large consumers,the unequal competitiveness sales between suppliers of green power and thermal power are caused by the RPS mechanism,and large consumers are also faced with high-cost pressure from the dual demands of load balance and RPS assessment.To solve the coupling optimization decisions of direct power purchase between power suppliers and large consumers,a double-layer game model with green/thermal power suppliers and large consumers under the RPS mechanism was established to obtain win-win outcomes for all participants.Multi power suppliers constituted a non-cooperative game on outside layer:each power supplier tried to make its quotation competitive to obtain more electricity purchase for large consumers.Power suppliers and large consumers constituted a master-slave game model on inside layer:all power suppliers optimized the quotation to maximize their profits,meanwhile,large consumers optimized the power purchase strategies with minimizing the trading cost under RPS mechanism,further to achieve win-win for all participants.The KKT conditions and the fixed-point iterative algorithm were introduced to solve the double-layer model.The simulations show that the game bidding mechanism can improve the competitiveness of green power supplies with RPS,and reduce the trading cost of large consumers.However,when the RPS quota ratio rises to a certain extent,the trading cost of large consumers will rebound with their Nash bargaining ability being weakened.This model can provide decision references for the optimization of direct power purchase strategy of large consumers under RPS mechanism.

关 键 词：可再生能源配额制 大用户 直购电 KKT条件 非合作博弈 主从博弈 

分 类 号：F426.61[经济管理—产业经济]