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作 者:[韩]李熙玉[1] Lee Hee-ok;Lee Yul-bin(Sungkyunkwan University,Seoul 03063,South Korea)
机构地区:[1]韩国成均馆大学政治外交系,韩国首尔03063 [2]韩国成均馆大学成均中国研究所,韩国首尔03063
出 处:《国家现代化建设研究》2023年第1期151-160,共10页Journal of Modernization Studies
摘 要:作为东亚发展型国家的代表,韩国从20世纪60年代开始了政府主导型工业化,其经济在朴正熙政府时期得到了飞速发展。东亚发展型国家理论认为,韩国经济迅速发展源于强大的“国家能力”为基础的“国家干预”。但是,这一说法实际上并不适用于朴正熙政府。当时,政府不仅为韩国财阀大企业集团提供各种特惠政策,而且还允许它们参与国家经济运行决策,对此,东亚发展型国家理论显然无力回应和解释。本文尝试运用国家基础性权力理论解读朴正熙政府时期的政策,进而分析阐释韩国独特的协调型政企关系的形成过程及其逻辑。As a typical case of an East Asian developmental state,South Korea has promoted governmentled industrialization since the 1960s,and its economy had grown rapidly during the Park Chung-hee Administration.The East Asian developmental state theory attributes the rapid economic growth of South Korea to state intervention based on strong state capability.However,there is considerable evidence suggesting that the proposition of strong state capacity was not always applicable to the Park Chunghee Administration.During the Park administration,chaebols,i.e.conglomerates,were not only given preferential treatment,but were also permitted to participate in national economic decision-making.This paper attempts to interpret Park Administration’s policies,based on the concept of infrastructural power,and thus analyze the unique collaborative state-business relation of South Korea.
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