地方政府债务与银行同业业务:理论分析与经验证据  

Local Government Debt and Interbank Business:Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Evidence

作　　者：赵旭霞 田国强 ZHAO Xuxia;TIAN Guoqiang(Shanghai University of Finance and Economics;Hubei University of Economics;Texas A&M University)

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学高等研究院,200433 [2]湖北经济学院财经高等研究院 [3]美国得克萨斯州A&M大学经济系

出　　处：《经济学（季刊）》2023年第1期159-176,共18页China Economic Quarterly

基　　金：上海财经大学数理经济学教育部重点实验室(2012111018);上海财经大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金的资助;上海财经大学国家级课题后续研究项目(2017110444);国家自然科学基金专项项目“中国经济系统建模与仿真”(72141303);中国博士后基金委面上项目(2021M690101);上海市“超级博士后”(2020182)。

摘　　要：近年来,我国银行同业业务规模迅速扩张,随之滋生的同业空转和同业异化等金融乱象,已成为触发系统性风险的重要源头。首先,本文构建包含银行异质性特征的动态随机一般均衡模型(DSGE),数值模拟发现,地方政府债务扩张会造成银行同业业务规模增加;福利分析表明,地方政府债务水平越高以及同业业务风险越大,地方政府债务扩张造成的福利损失越多。随后,本文实证检验发现,地方政府债务扩张会诱使银行更多地从事同业业务。In recent years, the interbank business has expanded rapidly and become an important source of systemic risks triggers. In this paper we construct a DSGE model and find that the expansion of local government debt is an important reason for the increasement of interbank business with numerical simulations. Further welfare analysis shows that the expansion of local government debt can induce welfare loss, and along with the current scale of local government debt and the degree of alienation of inter-bank business increases, the loss of economic welfare increases. The above theoretical conclusions are then empirically verified.

关 键 词：地方政府债务 异质性个体DSGE模型 银行同业业务 

分 类 号：F812.5[经济管理—财政学] F832.2