政府补偿方式、所有制性质与企业技术创新失败再创新  

Government Compensation Modes, Enterprise Ownership,and Re-innovation of the Enterprise Technological Innovation Failure

作　　者：张帆 狄鹏[1] 叶建木[2] Zhang Fan;Di Peng;Ye Jianmu(Department of Management Engineering and Equipment Economics,Naval University of Engineering,Wuhan 430033,China;School of Management,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan 430070,China)

机构地区：[1]海军工程大学管理工程与装备经济系,湖北武汉430033 [2]武汉理工大学管理学院,湖北武汉430070

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2022年第24期1-8,共8页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金军事学项目“民企‘参军’技术创新风险补偿机制研究”(2022-SKJJ-C-025);海军工程大学自主研发项目“民企‘参军’技术创新补偿研究”(202250A030)。

摘　　要：关注技术创新失败资源再利用以及创新失败补偿机制作用机理,基于2010—2020年沪深两市A股267家生物医药类上市企业的相关数据,以企业技术创新失败为研究对象,从政府补偿方式和补偿对象的特征、再创新行为等方面,采用分步回归方法进行实证分析。结果显示:(1)政府直接补偿与间接补偿均能提升企业再创新绩效,且直接补偿效果更显著,再失败情形下结果一致;(2)企业所有制性质存在调节作用,国有性质强化了政府直接补偿效果而弱化了间接补偿效果;(3)政府直接补偿与企业再创新的R&D投入存在倒“U”型关系,其中直接补偿存在临界值,临界以下表现为补偿溢出效应、临界以上则为补偿挤出效应,而间接补偿表现为补偿溢出效应。由此提出采取梯度补偿并设置最高额度限制、鼓励和引导更多民间资本投向种子期或初创期的失败项目或企业、设计容错补偿和激励补偿两阶段补偿机制等政策建议。This paper concerns the reuse of technological failure resources and the mechanism of innovation failure compensation, based on the relevant data of 267 A-share biomedical listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2010 to 2020, takes the enterprise technological innovation failure as the research object, uses the multi-step regression to carry out empirical analysis from the aspects of government compensation modes,characteristics of compensation objects, and re-innovation behaviors. The results show that:(1)Both direct government compensation and indirect compensation can improve enterprise re-innovation performance, the direct compensation effect is more significant, and the results are consistent in the case of re-failure.(2) The nature of enterprise ownership has a regulating effect, and the nature of state-owned enterprises strengthens the direct government compensation effect and weakens the indirect compensation effect.(3) There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the direct government compensation and the enterprise’s R&D investment for re-innovation, while there is a critical value of direct compensation, below which the direct compensation is shown as the compensation spillover effect, and above which is shown as compensation crowding out effect. As well as, the indirect government compensation is manifested as compensation spillover effects. Therefore, the gradient compensation and the maximum compensation limit are proposed to set, while more private capitals are encouraged to invest in failed projects or enterprises which are in the seed stage or start-up stage. Moreover, it is suggested to design a two-stage compensation mechanism for failure tolerance compensation and incentive compensation.

关 键 词：企业再创新 技术失败再创新 政府补偿 企业所有制 容错机制 激励补偿 

分 类 号：F204[经济管理—国民经济] F273.1[文化科学] F224G301