基于可持续性消费的企业质量价格决策研究  

Firm’s Quality and Price Strategy Based on Sustainable Consumption

作　　者：周建亨[1] 沈祎婷 ZHOU Jian-heng;SHEN Yi-ting(Glorious Sun School of Business&Management,Donghua University,Shanghai 200051,China)

机构地区：[1]东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海200051

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2023年第1期9-20,共12页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助面上项目(71872036);国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71832001);教育部人文社会科学项目(18YJA630153);上海社会科学项目(2017BGL018);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2232018H-07)。

摘　　要：随着可持续性消费理念的普及,消费者愿意为可持续性生产的产品支付更高的价格,这种绿色商品溢价能快速传导到价值链上游,进而推动绿色产业升级。本文在信息非对称环境下建立了一个可持续性制造型企业及其消费者组成的供应链模型,研究可持续性消费者比例与可持续性偏好对企业质量价格决策的影响。研究结论如下:在完全信息下,当企业只服务可持续消费者时,企业的收益随可持续性消费者比例递增;在信息非对称时,可持续性消费者比例越大,企业分离时所付出的成本越高,因此可持续性投入高的企业越倾向于混同而不是分离。另外,消费者的可持续性偏好对企业来说总是有利的。但是信息非对称时,可持续性消费者比例越高,并不总是对企业有利。With the popularization of sustainable consumption concepts, consumers are willing to pay higher prices for sustainable products. The premium of this green commodity can be quickly transferred to the upstream of supply chain, and promote the upgrading of the green industry. The investment in sustainability may be high(named H-type firm) or low(named L-type firm) which while it is not observable invisible to their consumers population. A signaling game model between the firm and the consumer is established to investigates the firm’s quality and price strategy in the presence of considering sustainability consideration and asymmetric information. Firstly, the quality and price strategy under symmetric information is calculated to obtain the benchmark of sustainability concerned issue. Furthermore, based on signaling game model under asymmetric information, firm’s separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium is obtained. Then, the impact of sustainability concerned consumers and sustainability preference is analyzed. It can be found that more sustainability concerned consumers make the H-type firm better off under full and symmetric information situation. However, under asymmetric information, increasing consumer awareness of firm’s sustainability investment may hurt the H-type firm. In addition, increasing sustainability preference is beneficial to the H-type firm, but it may lead to a higher profit for the L-type firm. Finally, when the fraction of sustainability concerned consumers is high enough, the H-type firm prefer to pool rather than reveal his true sustainability type. This paper aims at investigating the interaction between a firm and consumers in the presence of sustainability concerned sustainability consideration and asymmetric information. The finding of paper provides management insights for the firms.

关 键 词：信息非对称 信号传递 可持续性消费者 

分 类 号：F724[经济管理—产业经济] C934[经济管理—管理学]