药企合谋对药品招标采购的影响——以药品集中带量采购为例  

Effects of Collusion on Drug Procurement Auctions——Evidence from the National Centralized Drug Procurement Policy in China

作　　者：朱恒鹏[1] 岳阳 朱磊 ZHU Hengpeng;YUE Yang;ZHU Lei(Chinese Academy of Social Sciences;Xiamen University;Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院经济研究所 [2]厦门大学经济学院经济研究所与王亚南经济研究院 [3]计量经济学教育部重点实验室(厦门大学) [4]上海财经大学统计与管理学院

出　　处：《经济学（季刊）》2022年第6期2171-2192,共22页China Economic Quarterly

基　　金：世界银行科研项目(SBS-2020-03);国家自然科学基金项目(72173106;72133004)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：本文首先构建了动态招采模型,分析集中带量采购对投标过程中药企合谋行为的影响。模型预期,带量采购通过采购所占份额提高企业背离合谋的可能性,并降低合谋内的价格;带量采购会通过减少未来企业数量提高未来招标价格。我们通过案例分析现实中招采合谋的特点,并使用招标数据度量了政策影响。实证结果支持模型预期:政策使得药物价格平均下降86.6%;药品市场集中度越高,政策降价效果越小;各类药品招标频率越高,政策降价效果越小。We evaluate the effects of China’s National Centralized Drug Procurement Policy(NCDPP)on drug procurement results.We construct a dynamic procurement model to study bidders’collusion behavior.The model shows that:increasing procurement amounts or reducing procurement frequency incentivizes bidders to deviate from collusion,which causes lower bidding prices;the changes also reduce the number of bidders,which raises the future price.Then,we use the drug procurement data to examine the theoretical predictions.The results show that the NCDPP decreased the drug price by 87%on average;a high market concentration caused lower prices in the drug procurement.

关 键 词：合谋 药品招标采购 集中带量采购 

分 类 号：R95[医药卫生—药学] F426.72[经济管理—产业经济]