反垄断法与平台垄断(上)  

Antitrust and Platform Monopoly(Ⅰ)

作　　者： 兰磊(译)[2] Lan Lei

机构地区：[1]宾夕法尼亚大学法学院和沃顿商学院 [2]华东政法大学知识产权学院

出　　处：《竞争政策研究》2023年第1期66-97,共32页Competition Policy Research

摘　　要：与人们的普遍观念相反,和消费者直接交易的大型数字平台,如亚马逊、苹果、脸书和谷歌并不是“赢者通吃”的企业。它们必须依靠效能竞争或者排斥竞争行为才能获取或维持主导地位,这为反垄断政策提供了用武之地。尽管管制适合于某些方面,如消费者隐私保护,反垄断法则因采用针对具体企业的考察方式而更适于处理平台竞争遭受的大多数威胁。若平台针对其他企业行使市场势力,应当对其课以责任,但救济问题带来了新的麻烦。例如,在针对谷歌和脸书的几起待决反垄断诉讼中,如果认定存在违法行为,应当采取何种救济方式呢?在许多情形下,如对具有广泛规模经济和范围经济效应的大企业实施分拆,将损害消费者和大多数投入品供应商,包括为其提供劳动力的雇员。一种更为可取的方法是重组管理结构而非重组资产结构,如此不但能确保平台本身作为生产实体完好无损,而且提升决策的竞争程度。优于分拆公司的第二个选择是要求实现互操作性——在信息场景中,即责令共享有价值的信息。这些措施有助于促进竞争,同时提升正网络效应的价值。本文最后考察了平台相关的另一个问题,即其实施的收购行为。在最受关注的一类平台收购初创企业的交易中,竞争受到的最大威胁源于平台收购互补品或者差异化技术。然而,现行并购执法工具主要是针对横向并购发展起来的,不适于分析这种新型竞争损害。这要求采用一些新方式。Contrary to common belief,large digital platforms that deal directly with consumers,such as Amazon,Apple,Facebook,and Google,are not“winner-take-all”firms.They must compete on the merits or otherwise rely on exclusionary practices to attain or maintain dominance,and this gives antitrust policy a role.While regulation may be appropriate in a few areas such as for consumer privacy,antitrust’s firm-specific approach is more adept at addressing most threats to platform competition.When platforms exert their market power over other firms,liability may be apt,but remedies present another puzzle.For the several pending antitrust complaints against Google and Facebook,for instance,what should be the remedy if there is a violation?Breaking up large firms that benefit from extensive economies of scale and scope will injure consumers and most input suppliers,including the employees who supply labor.In many situations,a better approach would be to restructure management rather than assets,which would leave the platform intact as a production entity but make decisionmaking more competitive.A second option to breaking up fi rms would be to require interoperability—and in the information context,mandate the pooling of valuable information.These measures could promote competition and simultaneously increase the value of positive network effects.Finally,this Article examines another as pect of platforms—their acquisitions.For the mos t salient category of platform acquisitions of nascent fi rms,the greatest threat to competition comes from platforms’acquisitions of complements or differentiated technologies.Current merger-enforcement tools are ill suited to analyze this new variation on competitive harm.New approaches are required.

关 键 词：反垄断法 垄断 平台 双边市场 亚马逊 脸书 谷歌 竞争 自然垄断 

分 类 号：D912.29[政治法律—民商法学]