国有企业监督执纪中的法法衔接——“囚徒困境”模型对贪腐治理的启示  

Linkage of Laws in Supervision and Discipline of State-owned Enterprises: Implications of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Model on Corruption Governance

作　　者：苏泽琳 SU Zelin(School of Law,Shanxi University,Taiyuan Shanxi 030031,China)

机构地区：[1]山西大学法学院,山西太原030031

出　　处：《河南警察学院学报》2022年第5期46-51,共6页Journal of Henan Police College

摘　　要：国有企业的监督执纪是我国反腐败治理中的关键一环。由于国有企业的垄断地位、社会责任及营利性质,加之贪腐者的投机心理,使国有企业成为贪腐犯罪的多发区。打破贪腐者之间的信任关系,将其陷入“囚徒困境”,令贪腐的代价远大于收益,才能最大限度地规避贪腐行为的发生。具体应做到将监察法与党纪、刑事法律等相衔接,坚持“有限度的”纪法融合,禁止对党员干部随意问责;限制监察权,与公诉程序之间进行明确的界分,不能混同;鼓励国有企业建立合规制度,引导其走向市场经济自行调整之路,构建腐败防范体系,以实现对贪腐行为的有效治理。Supervision and discipline of state-owned enterprises(SOEs) is a key part of anti-corruption governance in China. The monopoly status, social responsibility and profitable nature of SOEs, coupled with the speculative mentality of corruptors, make SOEs a corruption crime prone area. Breaking the collective rationality of the corrupt and putting them in a “prisoner’s dilemma” can make the cost of corruption far outweighs the benefits, so as to avoid the occurrence of corrupt behavior to the greatest extent. Specifically, we should connect the supervision law with the party discipline and criminal law, adhere to the “limited” integration of discipline and law, and prohibit the arbitrary accountability of party members and cadres;limit the power of supervision, and make a clear distinction with the public prosecution process;encourage state-owned enterprises to establish a compliance system, and guide them towards the road of self-adjustment in the market economy, and build a corruption prevention system to achieve effective governance of corrupt practices.

关 键 词：监督执纪 法法衔接 “囚徒困境” 

分 类 号：D917[政治法律—法学]