电商平台反“搭便车”三方演化博弈研究  

Research on Three-party Evolutionary Game of E-commerce Platform Against "Free rider"

作　　者：刘德民 随力瑞 卢颖 Liu Demin;Sui Lirui;Lu Ying

机构地区：[1]河北工业大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《价格理论与实践》2022年第12期137-140,202,共5页Price:Theory & Practice

摘　　要：平台经济作为新兴的商业模式,逐渐成为我国扩大内需的重要引擎,同时对我国“搭便车”行为提出了新的监管要求。本文结合平台经济发展形式,以零售商、零售平台和消费者为主体,构建三方演化博弈模型并进行仿真分析。研究显示:当零售商平台定向输出信息广告投入水平大于平台非定向输出信息广告投入水平时,零售商会舍弃“搭便车”行为,消费者也会选择分享信息。基于此,政府要持续建设信息基础设施,降低平台信息的使用成本;要推进广告信息的绿色化,积极改善消费者线上购物环境,从而促进平台经济健康发展。As an emerging business model, platform economy has gradually become an important engine for China to expand domestic demand, and has put forward new regulatory requirements for China’s "free rider" behavior. Based on the development form of platform economy, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model with retailers, retail platforms and consumers as the main body and carries out simulation analysis. The research shows that when the investment level of the targeted output information advertising of the retail platform is greater than that of the non-targeted output information advertising of the platform, the retailers will abandon the "free ride" behavior,and consumers will also choose to share information. Based on this, the government should continue to build information infrastructure and reduce the cost of using platform information;We should promote the greening of advertising information, actively improve the online shopping environment of consumers, and promote the healthy development of the platform economy.

关 键 词：平台经济 网络促销 广告投放 扩大内需 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F724.6