检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
作 者:王为久 符国群[1,2] 薛海波[3] WANG Wei-jiu;FU Guo-qun;XUE Hai-bo
机构地区:[1]北京大学光华管理学院 [2]北京大学中国低碳发展研究中心 [3]华东师范大学工商管理学院
出 处:《城市问题》2022年第12期86-95,共10页Urban Problems
基 金:国家自然科学基金重点项目(71632001)——“家庭购买决策过程与机制研究:基于‘匹配’和‘社会比较’的视角”。
摘 要:北京和上海采用不同限购政策来配置“车牌”这种公共资源,北京的摇号制更加侧重公平性,上海的拍卖制更加侧重配置效率。从汽车闲置和居民满意度的视角看,在对北京和上海居民进行深度访谈和问卷调查的基础上,结合两地家用汽车行驶数据对政策实施效果进行了评估,结果发现:摇号制会导致摇号来源家用车的闲置发生概率提高,拍卖制对家用车的闲置发生概率则没有显著影响。虽然摇号制提高了北京市摇号来源的家用车的闲置发生概率,但上海市家用车的总体闲置率仍高于北京市,家用车出行强度也低于北京市。北京市居民对于车牌配置政策的满意度评价低于上海市居民的评价,但家庭积分摇号政策能够改善北京市居民对限购政策的满意度。Beijing and Shanghai employ different policies to distribute the public resources of license plates. While Beijing employs the fairness-oriented plate lottery system, Shanghai adopts the efficiency-oriented auction system. Based on the views of vehicle “idle” and residents’ satisfaction, this study compares the outcomes of the plate lottery system and auction system adopted by Beijing and Shanghai respectively. With in-depth interviews, questionnaire surveys and the dealers’ family-owned vehicles’ driving data, this paper attempts to empirically analyze the policy effects from the perspective of the demand side. Results show that: The plate lottery approach creates a higher level of vehicle idleness than the auction approach. Although the lottery approach has increased the probability of car idleness in Beijing, the overall idle rate of family cars in Shanghai is still higher than that in Beijing. And the average daily mileage for each family-owned vehicle in Beijing is higher than that of Shanghai. Beijing residents are less satisfied than Shanghai residents with vehicle plate allocation policies adopted by their residential city. The adjusted household-credit-lottery policy employed by Beijing improved Beijing residents’ overall satisfaction.
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:216.73.216.171