德国公司法中规范股东冲突的机制及其启示  

Mechanisms for Regulating Shareholder Conflicts in German Company Law and Its Implications for China

作　　者：高旭军[1] GAO Xujun(Law School,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China)

机构地区：[1]同济大学法学院,上海200092

出　　处：《北京理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2023年第2期57-68,共12页Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology：Social Sciences Edition

摘　　要：股东冲突有多种表现形态,在中国公司实务中经常会出现典型冲突形态有对赌协议、公司僵局和控股股东与小股东之间对立。如何更加科学合理地规范此三类股东冲突,是中国理论界和实务界长期关注的问题。围绕此三类股东冲突,详细论述德国《有限责任公司法》和《股份法》中的股份自愿回收机制、强制回收机制和股东忠实义务机制,分析借用德国公司法中这些机制解决中国对赌协议、公司僵局、控股股东和小股东冲突问题的可行性;在此基础上评析《公司法修订草案》的相关立法建议,并对中国现行《公司法》的修改提出相应的建议。There are various forms of shareholder conflicts, and three typical forms of such conflicts have emerged in China’s corporate practice, namely, Valuation Adjustment Mechanism, corporate deadlock and confrontation between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. How to regulate these three types of shareholder conflicts in a more scientific and reasonable manner is a long-standing concern of the theoretical and practical circles in China. Around these three types of shareholder conflicts, this article discusses in detail the Rules dealing with Voluntary redemption of shares, mandatory redemption of shares and shareholders, fidelity obligations in the German Limited Liability Company Act and the Stock Act, and analyses the feasibility of utilizing these articles in German corporate law to resolve these problems in China. Based on aforementioned rules, the relevant legislative proposals of the Draft Revised Company Law are reviewed and corresponding suggestions are made for the amendment of the existing Company Law in China.

关 键 词：对赌协议 公司僵局 股份回收 股东忠实义务 

分 类 号：DF411.91[政治法律—经济法学]