EPC联合体博弈行为仿真分析  

Simulation Analysis of Game Behavior of EPC Consortium

作　　者：叶晓牡 毛卿任 张宇[2] Ye Xiaomu;Mao Qingren;Zhang Yu(Huadong Engineering Corporation Limited of PowerChina,Hangzhou 311122,China;School of Civil Engineering,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China)

机构地区：[1]中国电建集团华东勘测设计研究院有限公司,浙江杭州311122 [2]西南交通大学土木工程学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《市政技术》2023年第2期203-208,共6页Journal of Municipal Technology

摘　　要：EPC模式在我国建筑市场应用广泛,联合体内部成员既是利益合作体,也存在利益冲突。因此,对联合体内部成员行为进行博弈分析极为重要。以杭州之江路输水管廊EPC项目为例,构建设计单位、施工单位和采购单位三方演化博弈模型,并通过仿真分析研究了影响联合体内部合作关系的因素。结果表明,联合体内部利益分配比例和损失分配比例对合作结果影响较大,应合理分配利益,实现风险共担,并建立适当的惩罚机制,提高违约成本,从而约束各方的行为。The engineering procurement construction(EPC) mode is widely used in construction industry in China.The members of the consortium are both cooperation and conflict of interest. Therefore, it is extremely important to conduct game analysis of the internal behavior of the consortium. Taking the EPC project of Zhijiang Road conveyance pipeline in Hangzhou as an example, a tripartite evolutionary game model of design unit, construction unit and procurement unit is established. And the internal cooperation relationship of all participants in the consortium are studied by simulation analysis. The results show that the proportion of benefit distribution and loss distribution within the consortium have a greater impact on the cooperation results. It is very important to reasonably distribute benefits and share risk. In order to restrict the behavior of all parties, appropriate punishment mechanism should be established to increase the default cost.

关 键 词：EPC模式 联合体 演化博弈 仿真分析 

分 类 号：F426.92[经济管理—产业经济]