成本信息不对称下业主与承包商的博弈研究  

Game research of owner and contractor under asymmetric cost information

作　　者：王绪民 郑顺超 WANG Xu-min;ZHENG Shun-chao(College of Civil Engineering and Environment,Hubei University of Technology,Wuhan 430068,China)

机构地区：[1]湖北工业大学土木建筑与环境学院,湖北武汉430068

出　　处：《煤炭工程》2023年第1期187-192,共6页Coal Engineering

基　　金：湖北工业大学博士启动基金项目(BSQD14014)。

摘　　要：在煤炭行业建筑工程招投标中通过构建业主和承包商的博弈模型,运用演化博弈的经典复制动态方程分析了双方最优策略组合,探讨了在信息不对称情况下承包商的投标报价策略;通过提前工期这个显性因素来反应承包商成本类型,方便业主能在信息不对称情况下区分承包商的成本类型;通过设计适用于不同成本类型承包商的激励契约,使业主达到优选承包商目的。研究表明:双方均衡策略是低施工成本承包商和正常报价,低施工成本承包商会隐藏其私人信息进行投标报价;通过设定合理的激励契约,承包商会表明其成本类型,且在其最优努力下可以同时实现自身与业主效益最大化。By constructing a game model between owners and contractors in the bidding of construction projects in the coal industry, the optimal strategy combination of both parties is analyzed using the classic copy dynamic equation of the evolutionary game, and the bidding strategy of the contractor in the case of information asymmetry is discussed;Through the explicit factor of advance schedule, the contractor cost type is reflected, so that the owner can distinguish the cost type of the contractor under the condition of information asymmetry, and the incentive contract applicable to the contractor of different cost types is designed to enable the owner to achieve the purpose of preferring the contractor. By designing incentive contracts for contractors of different cost types, the owner is enabled to achieve the purpose of preferring the contractor. The research shows that the balanced strategy of both parties is a low construction cost contractor and a normal quotation. The low construction cost contractor will hide his private information for bidding;by setting a reasonable incentive contract, the contractor will indicate the type of cost and make the best effort. It can maximize the benefits of both itself and the owner at the same time.

关 键 词：委托-代理关系 信息不对称 演化博弈 激励契约 

分 类 号：TD-05[矿业工程]