基于演化博弈的非耐用型应急物资政企联合储备模式研究  

Research on Government-Enterprise Joint Reserve Mode of Non-durable Emergency Materials Based on Evolutionary Game

作　　者：钱慧琳 蔡啟明 吴甜甜 QIAN Huilin;CAI Qiming;WU Tiantian(School of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics,Nanjing 211100,China)

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,南京211100

出　　处：《河南科学》2023年第2期274-282,共9页Henan Science

基　　金：南京航空航天大学研究生科研与实践创新项目(xcxjh20210905)。

摘　　要：以政企联合储备模式下的非耐用型应急物资为研究对象,考虑突发事件的不确定性、物资过期处理成本、政府补贴等因素,构建政府和物资储备企业的演化博弈模型.运用复制动态方程对政企双方的演化稳定性进行分析,得到6种情景下博弈系统的演化稳定结果,并进行仿真验证和参数分析.结果表明:(1)在情景3和情景5的条件下,政府和物资储备企业形成了有效的联合储备模式,具有较大的实用参考价值;(2)政府的储备成本、应急物资过期处理成本等因素与联合储备效率呈正相关;(3)当突发事件发生后政府的补贴和企业的储备成本分别大于一定数值时,政府和企业会选择不合作策略.Taking the non-durable emergency materials under the government-enterprise joint reserve model as the research object,considering the uncertainty of emergencies,the cost of material expiration and other factors,an evolutionary game model of the government and material reserve enterprises is constructed. The evolutionary stability of both government and enterprise is analyzed by using the replication dynamic equation,and the evolutionary stability results of the game system under six scenarios are obtained,and simulation verification and parameter analysis are carried out. The results showed that:(1)Under the conditions of scenario 3 and scenario 5,the government and material reserve enterprises formed an effective joint reserve mode,which has great practical reference value;(2) There is a positive correlation between the cost of government reserve and the cost of emergency materials expired treatment and the efficiency of joint reserve;(3) When the government subsidy and the enterprise reserve cost are greater than a certain value,the government and the enterprise will choose a strategy of non-cooperation.

关 键 词：演化博弈 联合储备 应急物资 政企联合 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]