从围观到入场:市场化债转股与企业现金股利政策  

From Audience to Player:Market-Oriented Debt to Equity Swap and Enterprise Cash Dividend Policy

作　　者：张雪莹[1] 孔晓冉 Zhang Xueying;Kong Xiaoran

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学金融学院

出　　处：《财经科学》2023年第2期28-40,共13页Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家社科规划一般项目“我国财政风险和金融风险‘反馈循环’及其协同治理研究”(21BJY003);国家自然科学基金项目“政府债务对货币政策的影响——基于利率传导渠道的研究”(71573155);山东财经大学国际合作项目(2022)的资助。

摘　　要：基于2016年逐步开展的市场化债转股,本文使用多期PSM-DID办法,考察了市场化债转股与企业现金股利政策之间的关系。研究结果表明,实施债转股的公司显著提高了其现金股利水平,且在考虑安慰剂检验等一系列稳健性测试后依然成立;就机制而言,债转股实施机构通过向企业施加一定的监督压力,提升企业信息质量以抑制内部人利益侵占等行为,进而增加了现金股利;文章还发现在内外监督强度较弱、轻度财务困境以及法律环境较差的公司内,债转股对股利水平的促进作用更显著。本文补充了上市公司债转股之后的财务行为研究,进一步拓展了现金股利政策与企业信息质量的实证检验。Based on the market-oriented debt to equity swap in 2016,this paper uses the multi-stage PSM-DID method to investigate the relationship between market-oriented debt to equity swap and enterprise cash dividend policy.The results show that the firms that implement debt to equity swap significantly improve their cash dividend level,and it is still valid after considering a series of robustness tests such as placebo test;As far as the mechanism is concerned,the implementing agency improves the information quality by exerting certain supervision pressure on firms,so as to reduce the probability of managerial entrenchment and other behaviors;The paper also found that in firms with weak internal and external supervision,mild financial distress and poor legal environment,debt to equity swap plays a more significant role in promoting the dividend level.This paper expands the research on the financial behavior of listed companies during the period of debt to equity swap,and further enriches the empirical research on cash dividend policy and enterprise information quality.

关 键 词：市场化债转股 股利政策 信息质量 公司治理 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]