“利益-规范”双重博弈--一个基础性探讨  

Dual Game of Interest and Norm:A Basic Discussion

作　　者：刘世定 严俊 刘玉照[2] Liu Shiding;Yan Jun;Liu Yuzhao

机构地区：[1]上海大学经济社会学与跨国企业研究中心(IESM) [2]上海大学社会学院

出　　处：《复印报刊资料（社会学）》2022年第7期47-59,共13页SOCIOLOGY

基　　金：国家社科基金重点项目“一带一路’倡议背景下中国企业‘走出去'问题研究”(20ASH011)。

摘　　要：社会规范与利益激励如何影响人类行为是经济社会学研究的核心问题。区别于既有的两种主流思路,本文尝试发展一种新的研究范式,在人们的利益和规范双重互动或双重博弈中考察其利益格局和规范格局的形成与变迁。基于对“利益-规范”双重行为假定下效用函数的重新界定,我们在博弈框架内探讨了不同行动策略与策略组合的运用特征及其引发的均衡或非均衡后果,并就该范式在推动社会学基础理论、方法与经验研究发展方面的潜力做出初步展望。In what way social norms and interests as an incentive affect human behaviors is the core question in economic sociology research.Different from the two mainstream paths at present,the authors of this study attempted to develop a new kind of research paradigm,which reveals the formation and transition of the framework of interest and the framework of norms in the dual interaction or game of interest and norms.By redefining utility function under the assumption of the dual behaviors of interest and norms,we discussed the characteristics of different action strategies and strategy combinations in the framework of game theory,as well as the resulting equilibrium or disequilibrium consequences.Finally,the authors made an initial expectation on the potential of this paradigm in promoting fundamental sociological theories,methods and empirical research development.

关 键 词：经济社会学 博弈论 “利益-规范”双重博弈 均衡稳定性 

分 类 号：C91[经济管理]