中国金融中心城市的“囚徒困境”  

“PRISONER’S DILEMMA”AMONGST FINANCIAL CENTERS IN CHINA

作　　者：郝凤霞[1] 吴赟 楼永[1] HAO Fengxia;WU Yun;LOU Yong(School of Economics and Management,Tongji University)

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,200092

出　　处：《经济理论与经济管理》2023年第2期46-62,共17页Economic Theory and Business Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“制造业服务化与产业价值链升级研究”(18BGL019)的资助。

摘　　要：当前,我国许多中心城市相继制定了一系列金融业发展政策,引发社会对金融中心过度建设的担忧。本文基于2006—2019年国内金融中心城市的数据,通过建立系统结构模型,发现政府政策推动促进了金融中心城市的金融集聚,但这一过程也是造成金融市场分割的原因。如果缺乏制度约束和政策协调,将倒逼地方政府深陷政策竞争的“囚徒困境”。进一步研究表明,全国金融中心的辐射范围远大于区域金融中心,而西部和东北是全国金融中心辐射功能相对薄弱的地区。因此,在西部和东北加快建设若干具有较强影响力的区域金融中心成为本文的政策取向。At present,many big cities in China have enacted financial industry development policies,causing concerns about the over-construction of financial centers.Based on the data of China’s financial centers from 2006 to 2019,this paper finds that the current policies promote financial agglomeration in financial centers,which is also the reason for the segmentation of financial markets.It is because of the market segmentation that forces China’s local governments to fall into the“prisoner’s dilemma”of policy competition.The empirical study afterward also shows that the radiation range of national financial centers is much larger than that of regional financial centers,while the radiation effect of national financial centers in west areas and in northeast areas is relatively weak.Therefore,optimizing the spatial layout of financial centers has become the effective solution to the“prisoner’s dilemma”.

关 键 词：金融集聚 金融市场分割 囚徒困境 金融中心优化布局 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]