寻租效应的“辛普森悖论”及其经济解释——基于ES2012CN的实证研究  

The"Simpson Paradox"on Effects of Rent-seeking and Its Economic Interpretation:An Empirical Research Based on ES2012CN

作　　者：张记高 金玉国 ZHANG Ji-gao;JIN Yu-guo(Data Center,Shandong Tourism Vocational College,Jinan,250200,China;School of Statistics,Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Jinan,250014,China)

机构地区：[1]山东旅游职业学院数据中心,山东济南250200 [2]山东财经大学统计学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《福建江夏学院学报》2023年第1期12-25,共14页Journal of Fujian Jiangxia University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“管制租金的内生机制、水平测度与效应评估研究”(18BJY205)。

摘　　要：管制寻租在提升微观(企业)经济绩效的同时,往往会降低宏观(国民经济系统)的整体经济绩效,说明不同观察角度(测度层次)上的寻租效应存在矛盾。基于世界银行的中国企业调查数据(ES2012CN),应用倾向得分匹配方法(PSM),对管制寻租的微观(企业)效应和宏观(地区/产业)效应进行测度,进而可以验证寻租效应“辛普森悖论”的存在。这一现象能够从管制寻租的负外部性角度进行经济学解释,具有重要的政策含义。While the regulation of rent-seeking improves the micro(enterprise)economic performance,it often reduces the overall economic performance of the macro(national economic system),indicating that there are contradictions in rent-seeking effects from different observation perspectives(measurement levels).Based on the data of enterprise survey in China(ES2012CN)by the World Bank Group,the method of"propensity score matching(PSM)"is applied to measure the micro(enterprise)and macro(region/industry)effects of rent-seeking regulation,and thus the"Simpson paradox"of rent-seeking effects can be verified quantitatively.This phenomenon can be explained economically from the perspective of the negative externality of rent-seeking regulation,and has significant policy implications.

关 键 词：管制寻租 寻租效应 辛普森悖论 倾向得分匹配(PSM) 

分 类 号：F222[经济管理—国民经济] F279.2