基于链与链竞争的延保服务渠道策略选择  

Channel strategy selection of extended warranties considering chain-to-chain competition

作　　者：唐华 艾兴政[1] 何浩嘉 郭松波 TANG Hua;AI Xing-zheng;HE Hao-jia;GUO Song-bo(School of Economics and Management,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 611731,China)

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都611731

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2023年第1期19-37,共19页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72072022,71572030);国家社会科学基金资助重大项目(20&ZD084).

摘　　要：构建由两个制造商和两个专有零售商组成的链与链竞争模型,考虑三种延保服务渠道策略选择情形——两条链均由制造商提供延保服务(MM),两条链均由零售商提供延保服务(RR)和一条链由制造商提供延保服务,另一条链由零售商提供延保服务(H),以探究链与链竞争环境下的延保服务渠道策略选择问题.结果表明,从供应链视角,MM和RR都可能成为均衡策略,且这两种均衡策略可能单独存在或同时存在.有趣的是,从制造商和零售商的视角,研究发现双方并非会一直偏好于接受同一种延保服务渠道策略,存在特定的区域使得制造商和零售商在策略选择上有冲突.此外,在链与链竞争环境下,分散化渠道情形下的系统总利润可能会优于集中化渠道情形下的系统总利润.This paper constructs a chain-to-chain competition model consisting of two manufacturers and two exclusive retailers to explore the issue of channel strategy selection of extended warranties considering chain-to-chain competition.Three-types of channel strategies are considered:Both supply chains providing extended warranties by manufacturers(MM),both supply chains providing extended warranties by retailers(RR),and one supply chain providing extended warranties by the manufacturer,and the other by the retailer(H).The results show that both MM and RR may become equilibrium strategies,and these two equilibrium strategies may exist separately or simultaneously from the perspective of the supply chain.Interestingly,from the perspective of manufacturers and retailers,they do not always prefer to accept the same extended warranties’channel strategy.There exist specific situations where manufacturers and retailers have conflicting strategic choices.Furthermore,the total system profit in the case of decentralized channel may be larger than centralized channel in the chain-to-chain competition environment.

关 键 词：延保服务 渠道策略选择 链与链竞争 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]