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作 者:关志民[1] 徐浩鑫 于天阳 董经洋 GUAN Zhi-min;XU Hao-xin;YU Tian-yang;DONG Jing-yang(School of Business Administration,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110169,China)
出 处:《东北大学学报(自然科学版)》2023年第3期447-456,共10页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)
基 金:中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(N2206004).
摘 要:分别在垄断与双寡头竞争情形下,研究不同市场结构下的低碳供应链运营决策问题,考虑减排技术投资的不确定性会引起制造商的失望规避行为,在两种情形下构建相应的博弈模型,探讨供应链的最优减排技术投资水平与定价决策问题.研究表明:垄断情形下,均衡结果与失望规避系数负相关,与减排技术投资成本效率正相关;竞争情形下,无论是低碳制造商主导还是双方权力对等,均衡结果与失望规避系数负相关、与消费者单位旅行成本正相关,低碳制造商主导时的低碳产品零售价格高于权力对等时,低碳制造商主导时的减排技术投资水平小于双方权力对等时,低碳制造商的期望利润和效用与减排技术投资的成本系数负相关,而普通制造商恰恰相反.The operational decision-making of low-carbon supply chains with different market structures is studied under the conditions of monopoly and duopoly competition.Considering that the uncertainty about investment in emission reduction technology innovation will lead to disappointment aversion among manufacturers.The constructing corresponding game models are constructed in both cases,and the relevant decision-making issues such as the investment level in emission reduction technologies and pricing of the low-carbon supply chains are discussed.The results show that in a monopoly situation,the investment level in emission reduction technologies,and the manufacturer utility are all negatively related to the disappointment aversion coefficient,and positively related to the investment cost efficiency of emission reduction technologies.In a competitive situation,whether low-carbon manufacturers dominate or both parties have equal power,equilibrium results are negatively related to the disappointment aversion coefficient,and positively related to the unit travel cost of consumers,retail price of low-carbon products are higher when low-carbon manufacturers dominate than that when power is equal;the investment level in emission reduction technologies when low-carbon manufacturers are dominant is lower than that when the powers of the two parties are equal,and in all power structures,the expected profit and utility of low-carbon manufacturers are negatively related to the investment cost coefficient in emission reduction technologies,while ordinary manufacturers are on the contrary.
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