谁的问责之手?——中国监管问责转型的动力机制分析  

Whose Hand of Accountability? An Analysis of the Dynamic Mechanism of Regulation Accountability Transition in China

作　　者：梁玉柱 Liang Yuzhu(Party School of the CPC Central Committee,Beijing)

机构地区：[1]中共中央党校(国家行政学院)应急管理培训中心

出　　处：《经济社会体制比较》2023年第1期116-125,共10页Comparative Economic & Social Systems

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“新时代中国官员问责的现实考验与优化路径研究”(项目编号:20YJC810008);国家社科基金重大项目“统筹发展和安全理念下建设‘更高水平的平安中国’测评的理论、方法与指标体系研究”(项目编号:21ZDA112)。

摘　　要：政府监管职能扩大使强化对官员监管问责成为必然要求,但对谁来推动监管问责,却存在认知差异。理论家们注意到集团、精英、国家以及意识形态对权责关系变革的作用,但存在来自具体时空叙事与宏大理论抱负之间张力的挑战,根源在于缺少对机制及机制间关系的阐释。文章以中国生产事故监管问责转型为线索,发现改革开放以来的监管问责中,事故调查经历了从行政集权到公共治理的转型,课责惩戒也在政纪驱动和司法能动下走强。监管问责从弱到强的核心机制在于压力型体制下的行政推动力和回应型国家下的司法能动力,目的在于增强中央权威的控制力,根源在于党政结构所具有的强国家自主性。中国监管问责转型展现了党政体制调适国家权力结构以与发展理念相适配的中国经验,是统筹发展与安全的历史展现。The expansion of regulatory functions has made regulation accountability inevitable, but there are no convinced answers about who should be responsible for accountability. Theorists have argued the role of class, group, elite, state, and ideology, but met difficulties because of a lack of mechanism analysis. This paper focuses on the regulation accountability of China’s workplace safety and analyzes the mechanism that promotes officials to be accountable. Studies have found that China’s regulatory accountability regime has undergone a system transition from weak to strong, reflected in accidents inquiry and discipline. The mechanism lies in the administrative impetus under the pressure-based system and the judicial discipline under the judicial activism, which is aimed at improving the central control and is rooted in strong state autonomy. The transition of the accountability regime in China shows an adaptive adjustment to the power structure with the development concepts on the basis of state-party autonomy and the history of balancing development and safety.

关 键 词：安全生产 监管问责 国家自主性 党纪政纪处分 

分 类 号：X922.2[环境科学与工程—安全科学] D262.6[政治法律—政治学] D630.9[政治法律—中共党史]