考虑社会学习及成本学习的新体验品定价  被引量:2

Pricing of new experience goods considering social learning and cost learning

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作  者:王淑颖 张建雄[1] 唐万生[1] WANG Shu-ying;ZHANG Jian-xiong;TANG Wan-sheng(College of Management and Economics,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China)

机构地区:[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出  处:《管理科学学报》2023年第2期36-48,共13页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基  金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71771164,71971152)。

摘  要:考虑具有成本学习的垄断企业在两阶段内销售一种新体验品,消费者通过在线评论学习产品质量信息.为研究企业定价与消费者策略互动,以及社会学习和成本学习的相互作用关系,构建了一个两阶段生产销售模型,运用理性预期均衡理论,对承诺定价和动态定价两种策略进行分析和比较.研究表明,仅当消费者策略性强且成本学习率较低时,承诺定价占优.更显著的社会学习和成本学习虽加剧了消费者的策略性等待,但仍然导致更高的企业利润.此外,对于企业盈利能力,两种学习效应之间的关系取决于评论活跃度、成本学习率和消费者策略性水平:替代关系仅发生在评论活跃度和成本学习率较低且消费者策略性较强时,否则二者表现互补关系.Assuming that a monopolist with cost learning sells a new experience goods in two stages,and consumers learn product quality information through online reviews,this paper studies the interaction between the firm’s pricing decision and the consumers’strategic behavior considering social learning and cost learning.This paper constructs a two-stage production and sales model and compares the price commitment strategy and the dynamic pricing strategy by applying the rational expectation equilibrium theory.The results show that price commitment is dominant only when consumers are highly strategic and the cost learning rate is low.Although social learning and cost learning effects may intensify the strategic waiting of consumers,higher profits still may result.Furthermore,for the firm’s profitability,the relationship between the two learning effects depends on the review activity,cost learning rate and strategic level of consumers:The substitution relationship only occurs when the review activity and cost learning rate are low and consumers are more strategic;otherwise complementarity relationship occurs.

关 键 词:贝叶斯社会学习 新体验品 成本学习 策略型消费者 定价 

分 类 号:F224[经济管理—国民经济] F713.55

 

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