上市公司原始股东的减持逻辑——基于信息优势视角的实证分析  

The Logic of the Original Shareholders of Listed Companies to Reduce Their Holdings:An Empirical Analysis Based on Information Superiority

作　　者：丁志国[1] 刘欣苗 赵晶[2] DING Zhi-guo;LIU Xin-miao;ZHAO Jing

机构地区：[1]吉林大学商学与管理学院,长春130012 [2]东北师范大学经济与管理学院,长春130024

出　　处：《吉林大学社会科学学报》2023年第2期82-100,236,共20页Jilin University Journal Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(19CJY060)。

摘　　要：近年来,中国股票市场出现了大规模高比例的原始股东减持,甚至出现了清仓式减持和离职式减持,而许多减持行为发生在股价处于低位且企业仍处在持续成长阶段。基于此,文章选取2006—2020年沪深A股上市公司原始股东减持样本,研究不同类型原始股东减持的急切程度、选择逻辑及其经济后果。研究结果表明:机构投资者和小股东最急于减持,而实际控制人最不急于减持,不同类型原始股东减持的急切程度取决于与企业内部决策信息的距离,越远离决策信息就越急于减持。总体看,原始股东减持主要依据关于企业前景的内部信息,也依据市场交易的外部信息;具体看,掌握决策信息少的原始股东减持更加关注确定性强的内部信息。原始股东减持行为具有明显的市场冲击效应,距离决策信息越近,冲击强度越大;除实际控制人以外的减持行为均未表现出明显的择时能力,减持周期越短错误程度越高;决策信息是判断企业未来价值的有效内部信息,而经营信息则可能会导致决策偏误。研究结论能够更好地解释市场现象,为投资者决策和管理层的市场监管提供科学的理论依据和数据支持。In recent years, a large-scale high proportion of original shareholders have reduced their holdings in the Chinese stock market, and even liquidation and resignation reductions. Many reductions occur when stock prices are low and companies are still in a phase of sustained growth. This paper selects the sample of the reduction of original shareholders of listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from 2006 to 2020, and studies the urgency, selection logic and economic consequences of different types of original shareholders. The results show that institutional investors and small shareholders are the most eager to reduce their holdings, while the actual controllers are the least eager to reduce their holdings. And the urgency of different types of original shareholders to reduce their holdings depends on the distance of the internal decision information, the farther away from the decision information, the more eager to reduce their holdings. In general, the selection logic of the original shareholders to reduce their holdings is based on both internal information about the prospects of the enterprise and external information about market transactions. Specifically, the original shareholder with less decision information pays more attention to the internal information with strong certainty, and the actual controller reduction is mainly based on strong certainty of internal information. The original shareholder reduction behavior has an obvious market impact, the closer to the decision information, the greater the impact intensity. Except for the actual controller, the reduction behavior did not show obvious timing ability, and the more eager to reduce, the higher the degree of error. The research conclusions can not only better explain market phenomena, but also provide scientific theoretical basis and data support for investors’ decision-making and management market supervision.

关 键 词：原始股东减持 信息优势 决策信息 经营信息 择时能力 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F271