应急管理能力建设:监督还是投入?——基于动态博弈的路径分析研究  

Capacity Building for Emergency Management:Supervision or Participation?Study on Path Analysis Based on Dynamic Game

作　　者：樊晶晶 吴健 FAN Jingjing;WU Jian

机构地区：[1]武汉大学政治与公共管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《决策与信息》2023年第4期79-96,共18页Decision & Information

基　　金：2021年度国家社会科学基金重点项目“健全退役军人工作体系和保障制度研究”(编号:21AZD072)成果。

摘　　要：应急管理的属地化管理致使地方政府与中央政府之间的权责不统一,分析影响地方财政投入行为与中央政府监督行为交互的因素和演化路径对提升应急管理能力至关重要。首先,考虑到地方政府的有限理性,运用前景理论描述地方政府在常态情境与非常态情境下对应急财政投入的感知价值。其次,通过分析央地政府间的博弈行为,央地政府策略选择行为的交互机理,求解演化稳定策略。最后,基于复制动态方程探究双方主体的行为演化特征和演化趋势,并分析不同因素对演化稳定策略的作用。利用MATLAB仿真工具,可视化不同情形下央地政府策略选择行为的演化稳定策略结果与演化趋势,经研究发现:(1)央地政府的策略选择受到奖励、惩罚、预算成本、监管力度大小等的影响,其中奖励、惩罚以及监管力度大小是影响其策略行为交互机理及演化趋势的主要因素;(2)通过分析不同因素变化对地方政府策略选择的影响发现:奖励调节与增加惩罚可有效促进演化趋于稳态的速率,且奖励机制要优于惩罚机制;(3)在一定条件下中央政府增加监督力度会弱化地方政府的反应速度。When coming to emergency management,localized management is one of the tough issues that creates ambiguity of rights and responsibilities between the central and local governments.To improve the capacity for emergency management,It is thus particularly important to analyse factors that impact local governments’participation in emergency management and their interaction with the central government who plays the role of supervision,as well as their management evolution path.First,considering the limited rationality of local governments,the prospect theory is applied in this paper to describe the perceived value of local governments'financial investment under ordinary and extraordinary situations.Second,the gaming behavior between central and local governments is analyzed to reveal their interaction mechanism in selecting strategic choices,and further find out the evolutionary stable strategy.Third,the evolutionary characteristics and evolutionary trends of the central and local governments are explored based on replicator dynamics,and different factors affecting the evolutionary stable strategy are analyzed.Then,the MATLAB simulation tool is utilized in visualizing the results of the central and local governments’evolutionary stable strategies and their evolutionary trends under different situations.The study shows that the strategy selection of central and local governments are influenced by factors including rewards,punishments,budget costs,and the degree of supervision,and among these factors,rewards,punishments,and the degree of supervision are the main factors that influence the governments’interaction mechanism and evolutionary trends in terms of strategy selection.By analyzing the effects of changes of different factors on the strategy choices of local governments,this study finds that adjustment on rewards and increasing punishments can accelerate the stabilization of the evolution,and that the tool of rewards is more effective than punishments.It is also found that under some conditions,intensifying

关 键 词：突发公共事件 应急财政投入 应急管理 中央政府策略 地方政府策略 感知价值 演化博弈分析 

分 类 号：C931.3[经济管理—管理学] F224.32F810