考虑企业社会责任和风险规避的港口物流服务供应链协调  

logistics service supply chain coordination considering corporate social responsibility and risk aversion

作　　者：杜浩杰 刘伟[1] 高志军[1] DU Haojie;LIU Wei;GAO Zhijun(College of Transport&Communications,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306,China)

机构地区：[1]上海海事大学交通运输学院,上海201306

出　　处：《上海海事大学学报》2023年第1期53-60,共8页Journal of Shanghai Maritime University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(20&ZD070)。

摘　　要：针对一个二级港口物流服务供应链的协调问题,综合考虑港口的风险规避行为和企业社会责任,使用条件风险值描述港口的风险规避行为,基于港口主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,提出收益共享与成本分担的协调契约,探讨港口的风险规避行为和企业社会责任对港口物流服务供应链利润和协调的影响。结果表明:分散决策时,港口的风险规避行为导致服务提供商期望利润减少,但港口承担企业社会责任有利于提高供应链成员的期望利润;当港口的风险规避水平在合理区间内时采用协调契约能够实现供应链协调,但港口承担过高的企业社会责任会导致协调失败。For the coordination issue of a two-stage port logistics service supply chain,the paper considers the port risk aversion behavior and the corporate social responsibility,uses the conditional value-at-risk to describe the port risk aversion behavior,puts forward the coordination contract with revenue sharing and cost sharing based on the Stackelberg game model led by ports,and explores the impact of the port risk aversion behavior and the corporate social responsibility on the profit and coordination of the port logistics service supply chain.The results show that:when adopting decentralized decision,the port risk aversion behavior leads to the less expected profits of service providers,but that the ports undertake the corporate social responsibility is beneficial to the increase of the expected profits of the supply chain members;when the port risk aversion level is within a reasonable range,the coordination contract can be used to realize the supply chain coordination,but the excessive corporate social responsibility undertaken by ports can lead to the coordination failure.

关 键 词：港口物流服务供应链 供应链协调 需求不确定 条件风险值(CVaR) STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F550.6[经济管理—产业经济] F274