产业创新政策与企业寻租——基于中央与地方政策的比较分析  

Industrial Innovation Policy and Enterprise Rent-seeking——A Comparative Analysis Based on Central and Local Policies

作　　者：黄鑫 周小梅[2] Huang Xin;Zhou Xiaomei(School of Economics,Zhejiang University of Finance&Economics,Gangzhou 310018,China;School of Economics,Zhejiang Gongshang University,Gangzhou 310018,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江财经大学经济学院,杭州310018 [2]浙江工商大学经济学院,杭州310018

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2023年第4期66-76,共11页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金专项项目“科学基金基础研究多元投入路径与经费管理模式研究”(项目编号:K1924001)。

摘　　要：本文以2012~2019年我国沪深两市A股制造业上市公司数据匹配中央政府与地方政府“五年规划”文本,基于委托代理理论、比较优势理论和政治锦标赛理论实证分析央地产业创新政策对企业寻租整体影响、作用对象以及规避手段的异质性效果。研究发现:(1)地方产业创新政策能够因地制宜地发挥辖区资源比较优势,激励企业获取长期创新收益而非短期寻租收益,由此削弱企业寻租倾向;(2)信息不对称下地方政府越位行为可能反向制衡中央政府监管并滋生企业寻租空间,中央产业政策会诱发企业寻租意愿;(3)政企关系视角下中央产业政策对企业寻租的诱导作用表现在政治关联企业中,地方产业政策对企业寻租的抑制作用表现在非政治关联企业中;(4)产业创新政策对企业寻租的纠偏作用在低强度财政补贴和税收优惠、高强度市场分割中效果更为明显。本研究对于如何释放产业创新政策的生产资源引导作用,实现政府职能定位由“掠夺之手”向“协助之手”转变,杜绝政府和企业间双向寻租提供政策启示。This article uses the data of listed companies of the A-share manufacturing industry in China's Shanghai and Shenzhen stock ranges from 2012 to 2019 and matches them with the text of the“Five-Year Plan”of the central government and local government.Based on the theory of principal-agent,the theory of comparative advantage and the theory of political championships,the article empirically analyzes the heterogeneous effects of the central and local industrial innovation policy on the overall impact,the object of action and the means of evasion to the enterprise rent-seeking.The research finds:(1)local industrial innovation policy can give full play to the comparative advantages of resources in the jurisdiction according to local conditions,and encourage enterprises to obtain long-term innovation benefits instead of short-term rent-seeking benefits,thereby weakening the rentseeking tendency of enterprises;(2)under the information asymmetry,local governments are offside.Behaviors may reversely check and balance the supervision of the central government and breed the rent-seeking space of enterprises,and the central industrial policy will induce the rent-seeking willingness of enterprises;(3)from the perspective of government-enterprise relationship,the inducing effect of central industrial policy on enterprise rent-seeking is manifested in politically connected enterprises.The inhibitory effect of local industrial policies on enterprise rent-seeking is manifested in non-politically connected enterprises;(4)the corrective effect of industrial innovation policy on enterprise rent-seeking is more effective in low-intensity financial subsidies,tax incentives,and high-intensity market segmentation.The study provides policy inspiration for how to release the guiding role of production resources of industrial innovation policies,realize the transformation of government function positioning from“predatory hand”to“assisting hand”,and prevent two-way rent-seeking between the government and enterprises.

关 键 词：产业创新政策 央地政府 企业寻租 分权改革 政商关系 制造业 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学] F124.3