考虑农户道德风险的订单农业供应链融资模式选择问题  

Channels Selection of Financing for Contract-farming Supply Chain Considering Farmer's Moral Hazard

作　　者：马中华[1] 金翔宇 MA Zhonghua;JIN Xiangyu(School of Economics&Management,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306,China)

机构地区：[1]上海海事大学经济管理学院,上海201306

出　　处：《物流科技》2023年第7期137-142,共6页Logistics Sci-Tech

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72072111)。

摘　　要：为研究农户道德风险对融资模式选择的影响,在考虑资金约束的农户和公司构成的订单农业供应链中公司以“保底收购、随行就市”机制进行收购的基础上,建立模型求解银行融资和公司定向融资的均衡,分析公司和农户对不同融资模式的偏好。结果表明农户违约这一因素能够凸显公司直接融资模式的优势,而随着农户违约风险增大,公司会更加积极地提供融资服务;农产品的产出不确定风险越高,农户与公司两者之间的利益就会越加趋同,公司同样也会更加愿意为农户提供定向融资服务。In order to study the influence of farmers' moral hazard on the choice of financing,a model was established to solve bank financing in the contract farming supply chain composed of a farmer that consider capital constraints and a company.The company purchases with the policy of minimum purchase price of grain.Analyze the preferences of the company and farmer for different financing models.The results show that the factor of farmer's moral hazard can highlight the advantages of the company's direct financing model,and as the risk of farmer default increases,the company will provide financing services more actively;the interests between them will become more and more similar,and the company will also be more willing to provide targeted financing services for farmers.

关 键 词：订单农业供应链 随机产出 融资均衡 道德风险 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]