The General Compromise Value for Cooperative Games With Transferable Utility  

作　　者：SUN Panfei HOU Dongshuang SUN Hao 

机构地区：[1]School of Mathematics and Statistics,Northwestern Polytechnical University,Xi’an 710101,China

出　　处：《Journal of Systems Science & Complexity》2023年第1期375-392,共18页系统科学与复杂性学报（英文版）

基　　金：supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.72001172,71871180 and 72071158;the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities under Grant No.310201911qd052;Natural Science Basic Research Plan in Shaanxi Province of China under Grant No.2020JQ-225.

摘　　要：The authors introduce the general compromise value for cooperative games with transferable utility.With respect to a set of potential payoffs of which the maximal and minimal potential payoff vectors are regarded as the upper and lower bounds for players,the unique pre-imputation lying on the straight line segment with these two vectors as the extreme points is defined as the general compromise value.Potential-consistency and maximal proportional property are introduced to characterize the general compromise value.

关 键 词：AXIOMATIZATION compromise value cooperative game solution concept 

分 类 号：O17[理学—数学]