地方财政竞争对区域要素市场一体化的非线性影响及其机制研究  

The Nonlinear Effect and Mechanism of Local Fiscal Competition on Region Factor Market Integration

作　　者：宋美喆[1] 周鹭 王雯 Song Meizhe;Zhou Lu;Wang Wen(Department of Finance,Hunan University of Finance and Economics)

机构地区：[1]湖南财政经济学院

出　　处：《金融经济》2023年第3期16-29,共14页Finance Economy

基　　金：2021年度国家社会科学基金项目“地方财政策略互动对城市群要素市场一体化的影响及优化对策研究(21CJY009)”。

摘　　要：地方财政竞争具有“逆市场”和“顺市场”的双重作用。本文立足于中国式财政分权的制度背景,构建面板门槛模型实证检验了财政竞争对要素市场一体化的非线性影响效应及其机制。结果表明,适度的财政竞争能够促成要素市场整合,过度的竞争则会加剧要素市场分割。在影响机制方面,财政竞争通过完善基础设施建设的渠道产生积极作用,通过加重工业产能过剩、加大省际贸易壁垒、提高对外开放程度的渠道产生消极作用。财政竞争的影响效应具有异质性,对要素市场一体化的正面影响在东部地区、2013—2020年间体现得更加充分。据此,本文从完善政府考核机制、推动财政竞争向财政合作转变、避免产业趋同和重复建设等方面提出对策建议。Local fiscal competition has both"hindering market"and"adapting to the market"effects.Based on the institutional context of Chinese fiscal decentralization,a panel threshold model is constructed to empirically test the nonlinear effects of fiscal competition on factor market integration and its mechanisms.The results show that moderate fiscal competition can facilitate factor integration,while excessive competition can aggravate it.Fiscal competition has positive effect through the channel of improving infrastructure construction,has negative effect though the channels of aggravating industrial overcapacity,increasing interprovincial trade barriers and increasing the degree of opening-up.The impact of fiscal competition is heterogeneous,the positive effect is more fully reflected in the eastern region and during 2013-2020.Accordingly,this paper proposes countermeasures in terms of improving the governmental assessment mechanism,promoting the transformation from fiscal competition to fiscal cooperation,avoiding industrial convergence and repeated construction.

关 键 词：财政竞争 要素市场一体化 非线性效应 

分 类 号：F812.2[经济管理—财政学] F123.9