在线旅游平台竞争与预订价格差异化研究  

A Research on Online Tourism Platform Competition and Reservation Price Differentiation

作　　者：邹光勇 刘明宇[2] ZOU Guangyong;LIU Mingyu(Hospitality Management School,Shanghai Business School,Shanghai 201400,China;Management School,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China)

机构地区：[1]上海商学院酒店管理学院,上海201400 [2]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《旅游科学》2023年第1期75-92,共18页Tourism Science

摘　　要：在线旅游平台预订高溢价及价格多样化现象引起诸多媒体报道、相关调查和社会各界广泛争议,也使得在线旅游双边市场定价理论面临新挑战。基于此,首先,文章由完全垄断和双边单归属市场拓展到Armstrong竞争性瓶颈市场进行研究,从静态市场和动态竞争两个层面分析平台竞争及定价规律。其次,文章采用实验法对上述规律进行验证和进一步拓展。主要结论如下:(1)文章揭示了酒店产品预订价格多样化的理论基础,即酒店产品预订价格与旅游消费者的使用效益、会员效益、酒店交易收益、平台转移成本之间均成正相关关系,与平台对酒店供应商的边际成本之间成负相关关系。(2)平台不管是否面临消费者转换平台消费的可能,都会选择忽视酒店利益以追求旅游消费者利益和平台收益共同最大化。平台对旅游消费者没有高溢价动机,现实中针对旅游消费者的高价只可能是平台的管理因素或个人原因所致的非理性行为,如酒店和代理商的差异化定价及平台方管理者的短期绩效因素等。(3)在动态竞争市场中,酒店佣金随着旅游消费者数量增加而增加,且平台市场有走向完全垄断的可能。基于上述研究结论,政府规制应锚定双边市场总价,平台应做好分类控制,避免短期非理性逐利行为,酒店在注重收益管理的同时,应尤其注重产品创新与技术效率提升。The phenomenon of high premium and price diversification of online tourism platform reservations has caused various multimedia reports,relevant investigations and extensive disputes in all sectors of the society,which also makes the pricing theory of online tourism two-sided market face new challenges.Based on this,this study firstly expanded from complete monopoly and two-sided single home market to Armstrong competitive bottleneck market,and analyzed the law of platform competition and pricing from two aspects of static market and dynamic competition.Secondly,this study used experimental method to verify and enrich the theoretical results.The results are as follows:(1)here is a positive correlation between hotel product booking prices and the use efficiency of tourism consumers,membership benefits,hotel transaction revenue,and platform transfer costs,while a negative correlation between hotel product booking prices and the marginal cost of platform to hotel suppliers exists;(2)regardless of whether the platform faces the possibility of consumers switching to other platform,it will choose to ignore the benefits of hotels in order to pursue the common maximization of tourism consumer benefits and platform benefits.The platform has no high premium motivation for tourism consumers.And In reality,high prices for tourism consumers can only be caused by irrational behavior caused by management factors or personal reasons of the platform,such as differentiated pricing of hotels and agents,and short-term performance factors of platform managers;(3)in a dynamic competitive market,hotel commissions increase with the increase in the number of tourism consumers,and there is a possibility of a complete monopoly in the platform market.Based on the above conclusions,this study proposed that government regulation should anchor the total price of the two-sided market,and the platform should control short-term irrational profit-seeking behavior while doing a good job of classification control.And the hotel industry should pay par

关 键 词：在线旅游平台 酒店预订 竞争性瓶颈市场 价格差异化 大数据杀熟 

分 类 号：F590[经济管理—旅游管理]