专业财经教育对投资收益的影响:基于基金经理的比较研究  

Impacts of Professional Financial Education on Investment Returns:A Comparison of Fund Managers

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作  者:游鹏 吴晞 王玉东[1] YOU Peng;WU Xi;WANG Yudong(School of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Science and Technology,Nanjing,Jiangsu,210094)

机构地区:[1]南京理工大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210094

出  处:《南京理工大学学报(社会科学版)》2023年第2期52-65,共14页Journal of Nanjing University of Science and Technology:Social Sciences

基  金:江苏省教育系统党的建设研究会课题“军工特色高校经管院教师党支党建与业务融合机制研究”(2021JSJYDJ02012);中国高等教育学会专项课题“归国留学人员统战工作创新发展研究”(21TZYB18);江苏省高等教育学会“十四五”高等教育科学研究规划课题“高校场所精神的当代困境与应对方略”(YB121)。

摘  要:在对比分析财经与非财经专业基金经理的投资风格和技能的基础上,尝试解释后者流行的原因。研究发现,就投资风格而言,财经专业经理人擅长利用系统性风险,而非财经专业经理人偏重非系统性风险。就投资技能而言,财经专业经理人能够获取更高的风险调整后的超额收益,而且他们的基金业绩排名更稳定;而非财经专业经理人风险调整前原始收益较高,这可能与他们逆市场周期的任职时点选择有关。结论表明系统化、专业化的财经知识教育具有无可替代的重要性。Based on a comparison and analysis to the investment styles and skills of financial and non-financial managers,this paper tries to explain the latter’s popularity.Results show that in terms of investment styles,financial managers prefer systematic risks,while non-financial managers rely more on non-systematic risks.The former has higher risk control stability,and the latter would adjust the portfolio more frequently according to size and momentum factors.In terms of investment skills,financial managers can surpass non-financial managers to obtain risk-adjusted residual excess returns,with a more stable fund performance ranking.Good original income is one of the reasons why non-financial managers are popular,but this may be related to their appointment time choices against the market cycle.This paper confirms the irreplaceable importance of professional financial knowledge education,but also provides some policy enlightenment for the optimization and reform of financial education system.

关 键 词:专业财经知识 教育 开放式基金 基金经理 

分 类 号:A11[哲学宗教—马克思主义哲学] A29[文化科学] G11

 

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