平台掠夺性定价的反垄断思路以反垄断法预防功能的限度为视角  

The Antitrust Approach to Predatory Pricing in Platforms

作　　者：张晨颖[1] Zhang Chenying

机构地区：[1]清华大学法学院

出　　处：《东方法学》2023年第2期61-72,共12页Oriental Law

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目"互联网经济的法治保障研究"(项目批准号:18ZDA149);"互联网平台的社会影响与治理路径研究"(项目批准号:21&ZD196)的阶段性研究成果。

摘　　要：依法规范和引导资本助力数字经济的健康发展是反垄断法的当代使命。掠夺性定价是典型的资本驱动型、资本资源型的垄断行为,就时序而言分为低价排他和高价补偿两个阶段;就经济逻辑来说,同时兼具排他性和剥削性。数字平台领域已经发生多起形式多样但实质为低价销售的行为,但我国没有关于要件的明确规定,在实践中也没有可依循的案例。主张废除补偿要件的观点,是从行为直接推断后果,完全超越了垄断行为通过侵权法认定的基础法理。忽略因果关系的分析,会极大提高假阳性的风险,有可能被低效的企业利用,干扰大企业的自主商业决策。在此背景下,应当构建以低于成本销售、补偿可能性为特征的要件规则,并经修正适用于数字平台经济领域的反垄断,以此作为反垄断法预防功能的限度。Regulating and guiding the capital to boost the healthy development of digital economy is the mission of the Antitrust Law.The predatory pricing is a typical monopolistic act driven by capital or capital-resource.In terms of chronology,it can be divided into low-price exclusion and high-price compensation.In terms of economic logic,it is exclusionary and exploitative.There are many cases of low-price sales in various disguises in the digital plaforms.However,China has no express legal provisions on the conditions for determining them and no cases to follow in practice.The idea of advocating the abolition of the conditions for compensation is a simple deduction of consequences from actions,which ignores the basic jurisprudence that the monopolistic acts should be determined by the tort liability law.The ignorance of causal analysis will greatly increase the risks of making mistakes,which can be taken advantage by lower-efficiency companies and interfere the independent decision-making of large companies.In this context,a set of rules for the conditions featured by sales below the cost prices and the possibility of compensation will be set out and adjusted for the antitrust regulation in the digital platforms as the limit of the preventive function of the antitrust law.

关 键 词：数字平台经济 掠夺性定价 低于成本销售 补偿测试 预防功能 反垄断 

分 类 号：DF41[政治法律—经济法学]