论反垄断纠纷的可仲裁性判断及实施机制  

Criterion for the Arbitrability of Antitrust Disputes and Its Implementation Mechanism

作　　者：胡程航 Hu Chenghang

机构地区：[1]华东政法大学国际法学院

出　　处：《国际经济法学刊》2023年第1期124-140,共17页Journal of International Economic Law

摘　　要：反垄断法私人执行机制和法经济学中成本效益理论为反垄断纠纷具备可仲裁性提供了理论基础。在判断反垄断纠纷是否具备可仲裁性时,可以区分纯粹国内仲裁和涉外仲裁,分别借助国内公共政策和国际公共政策确立可仲裁性的判断标准:国内仲裁中的反垄断纠纷的可仲裁性问题可以参照我国竞争政策和产业政策加以判断;涉外仲裁中的反垄断纠纷的可仲裁性问题应当参照国际公共政策并结合案件与我国的关联程度加以判断。在具体实施机制的建构上,反垄断仲裁可以依托内部仲裁程序规则的完善和外部司法审查标准的确立来实现私主体纠纷解决与社会公共利益间的二元平衡。The private enforcement mechanism of anti-monopoly law and the cost-benefit theory in law and economics provide a theoretical basis for the arbitrability of antitrust disputes.When judging whether antitrust disputes are arbitrable,foreign-related arbitration should be differentiated from domestic arbitration and the arbitrability criterion can be established based on domestic public policy and international public policy respectively.The arbitrability of antitrust disputes in domestic arbitration can be judged by referring to China’s competition policy and industrial policy;the arbitrability of antitrust disputes in foreign-related arbitration should be judged with reference to international public policies and the degree of relevance between the case and China.In the construction of specific implementation mechanism,arbitration of antitrust disputes can rely on the improvement of the internal arbitration procedure rules and the establishment of the external judicial review standards to achieve the dual balance between private dispute resolution and social public interests.

关 键 词：反垄断法 私人执行 可仲裁性 国际商事仲裁 公共政策 

分 类 号：D922.294[政治法律—经济法学]