一个经典的规制寓言——中国式股权众筹的“宿命”及其“供给侧改革”  

A Classic Allegory of Regulation:The“Destiny”of Chinese-style Equity Crowdfunding and its“Supply-side Reform”

作　　者：白诗晨 BAI Shichen(School of Economics and Law,East China University of Political Science and Law,Shanghai 200050,China)

机构地区：[1]华东政法大学经济法学院,上海200050

出　　处：《宁波开放大学学报》2023年第1期81-86,共6页Journal of Ningbo Open University

摘　　要：股权众筹被誉为一个经典的规制寓言,系普惠金融的又一化身。然“遁入”我国的股权众筹,只能以“互联网非公开股权融资”自称。《征求意见稿》奠定我国股权众筹发展雏形,根据制度变迁理论,私募众筹将是中国式股权众筹的“宿命”。投资者身为众筹的资金供给者,行为金融学理论表明投资者的有限理性和行为偏差,社会网络分析理论揭示股权众筹隐含的金融风险。循此,我国未来股权众筹制度,应结合规制投资者理论,通过适格投资者制度和投资限额制度矫正投资偏差、消融金融风险,借此夯实多层次资本市场之底座。Equity crowdfunding is regarded as a classic regulatory fable and another incarnation of inclusive finance.However,equity crowdfunding,which is introduced into China,can only call itself“Internet non-public equity financing”.“Soliciting draft”establishes our country’s equity crowd-funding developing embryonic form.According to the theory of institutional change,private equity crowd-funding will be the“fate”of Chinese equity crowdfunding.As the capital provider of crowdfunding,behavioral finance theory shows the bounded rationality and behavioral deviation of investors,and social network analysis theory reveals the financial risks implied by equity crowdfunding.Therefore,China’s future equity crowdfunding system should combine the theory of regulating investors,correct investment deviation and dissolve financial risks through appropriate investor system and investment quota system,so as to consolidate the base of multi-level capital market.

关 键 词：股权众筹 制度变迁 适格投资者 投资限额 

分 类 号：D922.28[政治法律—经济法学]