双重竞争者间接联结、门槛收益对企业创新的影响研究  

Research on the Impact of Double Competitor Indirect Ties and VC Fund Preferred Return on Entrepreneurial Innovation

作　　者：王晗 施国平 董建卫[3] WANG Han;SHI Guoping;DONG Jianwei(Xi’an University of Finance and Economics,Xi’an,China;Shanghai Business School,Shanghai,China;Northwest University,Xi’an,China)

机构地区：[1]西安财经大学商学院 [2]上海商学院财务金融学院 [3]西北大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2023年第3期389-399,共11页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年科学基金资助项目(72102173);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(21YJC630131);陕西省创新能力支撑计划资助项目(2022KRM113)。

摘　　要：基于竞争性信息泄露理论假说,结合风险投资(VC)机构实际运作方式,构建双重竞争性信息泄露理论分析框架,并将VC基金门槛收益这一有限合伙协议条款纳入其中,探究双重竞争者间接联结对企业创新的负向影响,以及VC基金门槛收益在上述关系中的抑制作用。研究表明:不论跨基金竞争者间接联结数量,还是同基金竞争者间接联结数量,均显著负向影响企业创新;VC基金门槛收益越高,跨基金竞争者间接联结数量对企业创新的负向影响越弱,同基金竞争者间接联结数量对企业创新的负向影响不发生改变。此外,当所投企业处于高科技行业时,上述作用更加明显。From the theoretical perspective of competitive information leakage,in combination with the actual operation mode of venture capital(VC)institutions,this research constructs a theoretical analysis framework of double competitive information leakage,and incorporates the preferred return of VC funds,which is a limited partnership agreement clause,into this analysis framework,so as to study the negative impact of double competitor indirect ties on enterprise innovation and the inhibitory effect of VC fund preferred return on the above relationship.This research mainly draws the following two conclusions.To put it concretely,first of all,both the number of cross-fund competitor indirect ties and the number of competitor indirect ties with the same fund have a significant negative impact on the enterprise innovation.Second,the higher the preferred return of VC fund is set,the weaker the negative impact of the number of cross-fund competitor indirect ties on the enterprise innovation.In contrast,the negative impact of the number of competitor indirect ties with the same fund on the enterprise innovation has not changed.In addition,the above effects are more evident if the invested enterpriseis in the high-tech industry.

关 键 词：双重竞争者间接联结 双重竞争性信息泄露 VC基金门槛收益 企业创新 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]