国税地税征管体制改革、信息获取与企业避税——基于国税地税合作的证据  被引量:3

Reform of State and Local Tax Collection and Administration System,Information Acquisition,and Corporate Tax Avoidance:Evidence from the Cooperation Between State and Local Taxation Administration

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作  者:张明昂 陈斌开[2] 岳林峰 Zhang Mingang;Chen Binkai;Yue Linfeng(School of Public Finance and Taxation,Central University of Finance and Economics;School of Economics,Central University of Finance and Economics;School of Economics,Peking University)

机构地区:[1]中央财经大学财政税务学院 [2]中央财经大学经济学院 [3]北京大学经济学院

出  处:《经济科学》2023年第2期71-88,共18页Economic Science

基  金:国家自然科学基金青年项目“信息完备性、婚姻匹配与子代人口质量研究”(项目编号:72203247);国家社会科学基金重大项目“实质性减税降费与经济高质量发展”(项目编号:19ZDA070);中央财经大学第六批科研创新团队支持计划“劳动、资本与消费的税收负担及优化研究”的阶段性成果。

摘  要:本文基于国税地税机构合作的视角,实证分析了国税地税征管体制改革对提高企业纳税遵从的作用。本文利用国税地税合作示范区的准自然实验构造双重差分模型并进行回归。结果表明,国税地税合作显著降低了企业避税程度,且该影响在社会资本高的地区、地税局征管企业、政治关联企业中更强烈。进一步分析发现,国税地税合作的抑制避税作用通过提高政府部门间信息沟通、降低企业信息不对称来实现。From the perspective of cooperation between state and local tax administration,this paper empirically analyzes the effect of the reform of state and local tax collection and administration system on improving corporate tax compliance.Using the quasi-natural experiment of demonstration zones of state and local tax collection and administration cooperation to construct a difference-in-differences model,we find that the state and local tax administration cooperation has significantly reduced corporate tax avoidance.The above-mentioned effect is stronger for regions with high social capital,firms under local tax administration,and politically-related firms.Further analysis shows that the tax avoidance reduction effect of the state and local tax administration cooperation is achieved by improving information communication between tax departments and reducing corporate information asymmetry.

关 键 词:税收征管体制 国税地税合作 企业避税 

分 类 号:F812.2[经济管理—财政学] F812.7

 

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