论垄断协议参与者的可救济性  

The Remediability of the Participant of Monopoly Agreement

作　　者：朱战威[1] ZHU Zhan-wei(Southwest University of Political Science and Law,Chongqing 401120,China)

机构地区：[1]西南政法大学经济法学院,重庆401120

出　　处：《现代法学》2023年第2期100-111,共12页Modern Law Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“互联网经济的法治保障研究”(18ZDA150);重庆市教育委员会人文社会科学研究一般项目“数据要素市场反垄断法实施困境及其制度破解研究”(22SKGH043)。

摘　　要：垄断协议参与者遭受损失能否获得救济,现行法尚未对此作出明确规定。司法实践中,有法院以参与者存在过错为由拒绝提供救济,也有法院作出截然相反的裁判。“同案不同判”不仅会造成司法体系的内部冲突,而且会损害垄断协议违法性要件的一致性和稳定性。鉴于垄断协议内部博弈的存在、整体竞争秩序的维护、垄断协议的隐蔽性等因素,应当深入考察垄断协议具体的内部形态及反垄断立法目的,避免“一刀切”式地否认参与者的可救济性。对此,应采取更具针对性的分类救济措施,具体包括引入“重大责任”及“累积性竞争效果损害”两项标准。The current law has not made clear whether the participants of monopoly agreement can obtain judicial relief for their losses.In judicial practice,some courts refuse to provide judicial relief on the grounds of participants’fault,and some courts make the opposite judgment results.“The same case with different judgments”will not only cause internal conflicts in the judicial system,but also damage the consistency and stability of the illegality requirements of the monopoly agreement.In view of the existence of internal gaming,the maintenance of overall competitive order,and the crypticity of monopoly agreement and so on,we should probe deeply into the internal forms of monopoly agreement and the antitrust legislative intent,in order to avoid arbitrarily denying the remediability of the participant of monopoly agreement.Facing the dilemma,we should focus on the antitrust practice,inducing the“significant responsibility”standard and considering the“cumulative competition effect damage”standard,thus part of the participant of monopoly agreement can be remedied by classified relief.

关 键 词：垄断协议 参与者 可救济性 分类救济 反垄断法 

分 类 号：DF414[政治法律—经济法学]