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作 者:王敏 WANG Min(Renmin Business School,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)
出 处:《运筹学学报》2023年第1期30-42,共13页Operations Research Transactions
摘 要:针对突发公共卫生事件下民众对应急防护物资疯狂抢购的问题,以及衍生的供求失衡、价格暴涨、质量良莠不齐等问题,基于演化博弈理论构建政府、企业和民众三方参与的博弈模型。考虑到恐慌情绪对抢购行为的影响,首先刻画了民众在恐慌情绪下的防护物资购买价值;然后结合模型特征,运用非线性系统理论探讨了不同参与主体间的演化机制,得出不同情境下的博弈均衡点和稳定性;最后通过仿真模拟进一步分析不同恐慌强度对参与主体行为演化的影响。研究结果对识别突发公共卫生事件下应急防护物资管理的演化机理具有一定理论价值。In order to solve the problem of people’s panic buying of emergency protection materials in public health emergencies,as well as the derived problems such as imbalance between supply and demand,uneven distribution,skyrocketing price and uneven quality,a game model involving the government,enterprises and the public is constructed based on the evolutionary game theory.Considering the influence of panic emotion on panic buying behavior,the paper first describes the value of people’s material purchase under panic emotion.Then,based on the characteristics of the model,the evolution mechanism between different participants is discussed by using the nonlinear system theory,and the equilibrium point and stability of the game under different situations are obtained.Finally,the influence of different panic intensity on the behavior evolution of participants is further analyzed through simulation.The research results can provide some reference for the evolution mechanism of emergency protection material management in public health emergencies.
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