考虑运营补贴与通行费定价博弈的高速公路PPP项目担保价值研究  

Study on Subsidy and Pricing Game of Expressway PPP Project under Traffic Flow Guarantee

作　　者：吴浪 吴小萍 Wu Lang;Wu Xiaoping

机构地区：[1]江西科技师范大学建筑工程学院

出　　处：《工程经济》2023年第2期60-68,共9页ENGINEERING ECONOMY

摘　　要：考虑到高速公路PPP项目的市场特征,基于实物期权模型分析交通量担保价值,引入定价的微分状态方程,构建政府与高速公路特许期运营公司的Stackelberg微分博弈期权定价模型。量化运营补贴、定价与交通量担保期权,分析成本系数、价格敏感系数以及运营质量等相关参数对投资决策的影响。通过对实际案例的调查结果对其展开综合性数值模拟分析,可以得出交通量补贴与通行费价格的Stackelberg博弈均衡点及公私博弈下的交通量担保价值。该方法结果表明,从高速公路补贴与通行费定价博弈的角度量化政府担保价值,更具有现实意义。Taking into account the market characteristics of highway PPP projects,the Stackelberg differential game option pricing model between the government and the highway concessionaire is constructed by combining the real options model with the analysis of the guaranteed traffic value and introducing the differential state equation of pricing.The model quantifies the impact of operating subsidies,pricing and traffic guarantee options,and related parameters such as cost coefficients,price sensitivity coefficients and operational quality on investment decisions.Comprehensive numerical simulations are carried out using the findings of reallife cases to derive the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game of traffic subsidies and toll prices,as well as the value of the traffic guarantees under the public-private game.The results of this method suggest that it is more relevant to quantify the value of government guarantees from the perspective of the game of highway subsidies and toll pricing.

关 键 词：高速公路PPP模式 运营补贴 通行费定价 交通量担保 Stackelberg微分博弈 

分 类 号：F542[经济管理—产业经济] F283F224